

also feels this way—describes the importance of this NATO expansion debate, it is hard to describe its importance in terms that are too strong. It is enormously important. I hope it will not be just legislative filler here. There must be a significant debate. I will come at some point and engage in that discussion and share some of my feelings about it.

The point I was making earlier is that I hoped very much that, as we were told last week, we were going to be on the subject of education. I know the Senator from Delaware and I disagree on the underlying bill of the Senator from Georgia, but I expect we will not disagree on a range of other amendments that will be offered. These amendments represent the only opportunity for those of us who have ideas about how to address some of the central problems in education to bring those to the floor.

If you are not in a position where you are the one who determines how this Senate schedules its business, the only opportunity you have if you have an idea—and everyone here has ideas, and some of them are wonderful and some not so wonderful—depends upon a set of Senate rules that say the last Senator has the opportunity to seek the floor and offer an amendment. Every other Senator can vote against it if they think it is not a very good amendment, but you have the right to take these ideas and turn them into proposals and ask your colleagues to weigh in on them after a debate.

That is why I worry a little bit. We have gotten to the point where, over several months, anything that is amendable somehow becomes a nuisance. Gee, if somebody is going to be down here and actually wants to offer ideas, what kind of nut is that? What a nuisance that is for the legislative process. I say, that is not a nuisance, that is the way the system works. Is it efficient? No, not very efficient. Is it effective? Name one other chamber or one other country that equals this. There aren't any and never have been.

My complaint today was that we are not on the subject that we expected to be on, that I want us to be on, that represents the central issues concerning our country. Is NATO important? Sure. I hope it is scheduled at some point when there is a significant block of time, with the best thinkers in this Chamber standing up and telling us what they know and what they have seen and what they understand about the foreign policy relationships and the impact of those relationships. That is what I hope we will do.

I don't run this place and probably never will. But I hope that the relationship that we have—and I think a lot of the majority leader; I think he is an awfully good majority leader, although I hope some day soon he will be the minority leader—will allow everyone to understand that we all have rights. We all have our issues that compel us to run for public office, and

one of those for a lot of us on this side of the aisle is education. I regret very much that the bill of the Senator from Georgia was pulled, and we hope it is back soon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.

Mr. BIDEN. I see my colleague from Nebraska is here. We worked closely together on the Foreign Relations Committee.

I say to the Senator, I have an opening statement in the hope and expectation that we really will debate NATO now for some time. To make it clear to my colleagues who are listening, I have no strong preference whether we have education on the floor or NATO expansion on the floor; I just hope whatever we have, we stick with it, so there is coherence to the debate. That is my overall point.

I ask my friend from Nebraska, as the manager for the Democrats on the NATO expansion issue, I have what we might call the obligatory very long and detailed statement. My statement is probably the better part of a half hour to 45 minutes. I don't want to begin if my friend would rather speak now. I want to accommodate the Senator. When I begin, I would like to be able to begin and, in an attempt to be coherent, lay out in detail my position on NATO expansion.

Mr. HAGEL. I have never known my friend and colleague not to be coherent on any issue, but if that is his wish to proceed, please do. I do not have an opening statement, so I think that would fit into the schedule.

Mr. BIDEN. I will proceed.

I thank my colleague and I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. President, I rise in support of the Resolution of Ratification of the Protocol for the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, which we oftentimes refer to as the Washington Treaty.

On March 3, the Foreign Relations Committee, in a show of overwhelming bipartisan support, agreed to the resolution expanding NATO by a vote of 16-2. The decision of whether or not to enlarge NATO for a fourth time in its history is a momentous one. Unlike the admission of Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, NATO now, for the first time, is proposing to welcome former members of the now-defunct Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Organization.

Mr. President, the rationale for favorable action on the resolution of ratification, in my view, is very clear.

For political, economic, strategic, and cultural reasons, Europe remains an area of vital interest to the United States of America. We are a European power, and for our own safety's sake, in my view, we must remain a European power. Stability on that continent is fundamental to the well-being of our country and to our ability to move our assets and attention quickly to other parts of the world when necessary.

The primary purpose and benefit of NATO, since its inception in 1949, has been ensuring stability in democratic Europe by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of alliance members. I argue, Mr. President, that this focus continues. History shows us that when there is a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, countries are forced to pursue their own individual security arrangements. We saw that before and after World War I. Enlargement, Mr. President—and this is a central reason why I believe it is in our interest to enlarge NATO, to embrace the three countries in question—will preclude a repeat of the developments in post-World War I. Enlargement will extend the zone of stability and help eliminate the gray area in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the prospect of enlargement has already had a positive impact on stability by stimulating internal reforms in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic and encouraging them to resolve historic disputes with their neighbors.

Mr. President, prior to Poland being offered the opportunity to join NATO, there was a question of whether or not the military controlled the military or civilians controlled the military in Poland. They made a very difficult political decision of doing what was stipulated in the Perry requirements—that is, the requirements set forth by former Secretary of Defense Perry—for expansion of NATO, and what all other NATO nations have done, which is to guarantee that there is civilian control of the military. I respectfully suggest that that action would not have been taken but for moving into NATO.

The three applicants for NATO membership before us have resolved long and historic border disputes such as those between Poland and Germany, and Hungary and Romania. Romania, also hoping to become a member of the NATO, has for the first time in modern history reached an agreement for the equitable treatment of its Hungarian minority. I could cite you example upon example in Central and Eastern Europe where actions have been taken as a consequence of even the prospect of NATO membership. This prospect, of being anchored to the West, has caused many countries in that region to accord their behavior with international norms that we believe are minimum requirements for countries with whom we wish to be allied. So the process of NATO enlargement has already had, in my view, a very stabilizing impact on Europe.

Numerous witnesses before our committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, have made a compelling case for

NATO enlargement. They have not only made it to our committee, Mr. President, but to the committees on which you serve; they have made compelling cases of the strategic value of embracing the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians as our allies in NATO in the Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee, as well. They talked about the qualifications for NATO membership and the fact that they will be net contributors to the alliance that we call NATO.

My colleagues who vote for this resolution should, however, be clear about the costs. I realize that some outside groups who support NATO expansion, because they know I am such a champion of expansion and that I speak around the country about it, will say don't talk so much about the cost, because obviously the cost could be an Achilles' heel for enlargement. But I believe, Mr. President, as I said earlier, no foreign policy can be sustained, no matter how well conceived, without the informed consent of the American people. I think that one thing that your generation and mine learned about Vietnam, whatever other lesson we take away from Vietnam, is that without the informed consent of the American people, no policy can last.

Part of the informed consent is to be honest and straightforward with the American people about the obligations we will be undertaking financially, politically, and militarily if we expand NATO. For what I do not want to see happen—it would be tragic—is to enlarge NATO, and 2 years later when the bill comes due, for colleagues who voted for expansion to say, "Wait, I didn't know it was going to cost me more money; I am not going to vote for more money." Such a turn of events would exacerbate the always-present burdensharing debate within NATO, and could harm alliance cohesion. So I think it is important, Mr. President, that we be frank with ourselves about the costs. I look forward to debating my colleagues on what I think are very manageable costs, with benefits that far exceed any cost that expansion will entail.

My colleagues who vote for the resolution should know what these costs are. They are real, but they are manageable. The most recent NATO estimates, which I will be talking about in great detail as this debate unfolds, calculate that direct costs to the United States will be roughly \$40 million a year over the next 10 years. That is \$400 million over the next 10 years. That is what it will cost, our direct costs, to bring these three applicants into the alliance. This reflects a realistic assessment of the state of the military infrastructure in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and the threats that presently face NATO, which in a military sense are virtually nonexistent. It also reflects an equitable sharing of the burden among the existing 16 NATO members.

In fact, a condition which the Foreign Relations Committee set forth in

the resolution of ratification states, in effect, if there is not an equitable burdensharing arrangement, don't count us in. For example, I served with one of this nation's great Senators, Russell Long from Louisiana, who was chairman of the Finance Committee. I remember going up to him one day on the floor—I don't think he would mind my saying this—I walked up to him and said, "Mr. Chairman, I would like your help" on such and such a piece of legislation. It was in the Finance Committee. He looked at me—and those of you who served with him know he used to put his arm around your neck—and he said, "JOE, as my uncle used to say, I ain't for any deal I ain't in on."

The truth of the matter is, if we want the American people in on this deal, we have to let them know what the costs are, what it's going to be. We also have to, frankly, let our allies know what we expect of them and what portion of the cost we are contemplating they will carry. So that's why the resolution that the Senator from Nebraska and I helped report out of our committee specifies that the burdensharing must be equitable. And we go on in legislative language in the committee report to explain what we mean by that. But, again, I will come back to that point and many others that I will raise today as we continue this debate.

Many have raised the possibility that enlargement of NATO may damage our relations with Russia. Mr. President, I believe very strongly, as one Senator who has spent a lot of time dealing with these foreign policy issues—which doesn't qualify me for anything other than knowing the arguments—that the single most important bilateral relationship our country has to deal with and nurture over the next decade is that with Russia. If Russia moves into the mode of being a democratic republic with a market economy, that bodes very well for us and our ability to deal with Russia and the rest of the world. If Russia turns into an absolute failure—something approaching the aftermath of the Weimar Republic—where totalitarian government re-emerges and militarism takes hold—that is very bad for us, and it is very bad for the world. So I take very seriously those Senators—and I count myself as one of them—who look at this enlargement of NATO, not solely, but in part, through the prism of how will this affect the single most important relationship we have, in my view, with another country.

I come to a very different conclusion from some of the critics. I believe that the guaranteed stability in Central Europe that will be brought about as a consequence of expansion will enhance Russian security rather than diminish Russian security. I spent a great deal of time speaking with our Russian counterparts in the Duma, as well as with every leader of the four or five major factions in Russia—from true Democrats to old apparatchiks—and not a single solitary person I spoke

with in Moscow believed that Russian security was diminished by the expansion of NATO. Not a single one viewed it as a threat. None of them liked it. Views ranged from seeing it as a slap in the face to a reflection of the attitude of the West that we never wanted Russia to be part of the West. Neither is true. Both are understandable. This is a nation that, as my mother would say, has fallen from grace, fallen very far—a superpower that is on the balls of their heels right now and feeling very, very put upon—a proud nation that has lost its empire.

I am not suggesting that we have to do anything that would allow them to regain their empire, but I am suggesting that it is not difficult to understand their present thinking. I want to make it clear that I don't believe anyone can give me any proof or evidence that the enlargement of NATO to include these three countries in any way is likely to alter Russian behavior because Moscow now believes its security interests are in greater jeopardy than they were before. I do not believe there is any credible evidence to sustain that assertion, an assertion you will hear made over and over again by opponents of expansion on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

As I said, I do not dismiss the concerns that have been raised by my colleagues in this regard. But that is the very reason why I enthusiastically back the NATO-Russian Founding Act. The Founding Act, signed by Russia and NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana in the name of NATO, negotiated a consultative relationship with Russia on what we call "transparency." In this agreement, NATO basically says, "Hey, Russia, look. This is what we are doing. We don't intend it as a threat to you. It is not an offensive threat to you. And, to prove it to you, we will let you take a look at what we are doing." That is smart negotiating. That is smart business. That makes good sense.

This act, which Russia signed formally with NATO—not just with us, with NATO—laid out how the alliance would give the Russians access to information. So that there was no reason for them to believe that we were doing anything as an offensive against them. To ensure Russian confidence that threat is not the rationale behind our action.

I note parenthetically that one of my colleagues said to me at lunch, "Joe, I just spoke with a Russian ambassador, and he says that we refused to promise what they wanted us to promise—that we would never station additional forces and/or equipment and/or nuclear weapons on the soil of these three countries, and therefore we are engaged in a breach of good faith." That is somewhat disingenuous, if that is what was said, and if I understood it correctly. Russia asked us to formally commit that we would not do that. We cannot formally commit to that. We cannot yield our sovereignty decisions to another nation.

But what we did say was that this alliance—and what all of the Presidents of each of the three applicant countries fully understand—has no intention, no plans, no requirement, and there is no request from any of the applicant countries that NATO forces be stationed on their soil. Further, we said that there was no need for conventional equipment of an offensive nature to be forward-based on their soil or for nuclear weapons to be placed on their soil. We have committed that we will not do that. We have not, nor should we ever, commit that in writing to another power.

Militarily speaking, what this expansion is going to require of us, as well as the Poles and the 15 other nations, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, is the time and money to upgrade the applicants' military infrastructure. This means bringing up to NATO standards the runways, the hangars, the storage depots, the fuel depots, et cetera, as contingencies against an offensive action against these countries in the future by someone else. But upgrading infrastructure against a possible exterior threat is a distinction with a gigantic difference.

NATO enlargement has been facilitated greatly by this Founding Act. In fact, the text of the resolution of ratification puts the Senate on record as supporting the Founding Act while restating the supremacy of the North Atlantic Council and advocating a new and constructive relationship with Russia.

I know all of my colleagues on the floor know what the North Atlantic Council is. But since I am talking about the informed consent of the American people—and I hope they are listening—the North Atlantic Council is that mechanism whereby the designated representatives of the leaders of each of the 16 NATO countries meet and make policies, where they make the decisions. And Russia has no voice within that organization, nor should they, nor should any non-NATO member have a voice within that organization. But that is very different from saying that the North Atlantic Council should not reassure, if it chooses to do so, Russia, or any other nation, that we have no ill intent by what we do, allowing them to see, allowing them literally to have offices in a similar complex to be able to see what we are about.

Those of you who are students of history, as I am—and it is sort of my avocation—would not disagree about the point made by some historians that World War I occurred in part as a consequence of a mistake, a mobilization that was meant to be a response but was viewed as an offensive. And things started unraveling. If there had been "transparency," we may never have gotten to the point where the war started the way it did, and when it did, and where it did.

So NATO enlargement, as I said, Mr. President, is a historic opportunity for

the United States to set a positive course upon a situation in Europe, Russia, and the neighboring countries that is dynamic and fluid. Voting to enlarge NATO now, in my view, expands the zone of stability eastward, embracing those dynamic forces of positive change, giving them a chance to take hold and bear fruit in the future.

I don't know whether your parents as you grew up had the same expressions that mine had. I will bet that if you sit down and give me 2, 3, or 5 expressions that your mother or father used more than 100 times, we could all come up with something. One of them that was heard in my family was, "Sometimes it is better to have a direction and move than to have no idea what you want to do." Part of what we are doing here is giving direction to a fluid European security situation where no one can predict with any degree of certainty what is going to happen in Russia any more than they could guarantee the future of Romania, Poland, or any country in Central or Eastern Europe. But absent a structure, absent a framework, plan, a well thought out architecture, the likelihood of greater mistakes and more mistakes being made increases, in my opinion.

So I go back to the central theme that my colleagues will hear me speak to time and again. Expanding the zone of stability into the gray area of Central and Eastern Europe is in the interest of all countries, including Russia. For the last thing, it seems to me that you would want, if you were a Russian leader is instability to your West. In saying this, I do not presume to tell another politician what is in his interest, or to tell another country what is in its interest. But I would respectfully suggest that if any of us were the leader of Russia, we would much prefer that there be peace and stability between Poland and Germany, Poland and Belarus, and Romania and Hungary, and so on and so on. Instability works against Russian interests as well as our own. This is a place where conscience and convenience cross paths, in my view.

Mr. President, for all of those reasons, I believe that there is an overwhelming case for the bottom-line value to America of expanding NATO. Inevitably, however, the qualitative new situations surrounding the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have occasioned serious questions, which I will attempt to deal with shortly.

Before I turn to them, I thought I should dispel one procedural claim that has resurfaced in recent days. That claim alleges that there has been insufficient discussion of NATO enlargement to warrant the issues being considered by the full Senate at this time. That is the tactic, I say to the chairman of the full committee, Senator HELMS, which we find those who oppose our position keep falling back to—a different strategy. First the tactic. I should say "tactic" rather than "strat-

egy." It was a frontal assault—which is their right, and I respect it—to stop expansion. I think they believe and have concluded that the momentum was too strong to do that.

Then the next tactic was, Well, what we will do is we will not be able to fight expansion, but let's set conditions to expansion that could not be realistic, nor should necessarily be fulfilled before there is admission—conditions, I might add, we never set on the four previous occasions we enlarged NATO. Then when that looked like it might take hold—we don't know until we count the votes—but when that didn't seem to be gaining fervor, the part of the foreign policy community which I would argue is a minority of the community, including some of our well respected former colleagues who disagree with expansion, and some of our well respected present colleagues who disagree with our position, decided on a new tactic, and that was to argue that we just have not given sufficient time to debate this issue, so why doesn't the majority leader postpone the consideration of this for an indefinite period so we can really debate it.

I asked one of the newspapers who made that argument—a reporter for one of the newspapers; he doesn't set the policy. I said, "I found it fascinating that you want an open and thorough debate. Your paper talked about the need for that. And yet, when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee"—I will document this in a moment—"had hours and hours of hearings on this subject and finally voted on the resolution, it appeared in a small box below a Monica Lewinsky story. I don't quite get this." Do you know what this person told me? He told my press person, "Well, another major paper in America put it on the front page. We will wait until we get to the debate and final vote."

Now, look. You can't have it both ways. This is not a subject that is going to get my mom at home saying, "Joey, I am so glad you are working on NATO. I think you should do that. Put aside Social Security. Don't worry about that. And put aside Medicare. Don't worry about that. And, by the way, education." Americans don't think that way, they never have, about foreign policy. They have enough trouble figuring out how to put food on the table, sending their kids to school, how to pay the medical bills, and how to keep their jobs.

So this notion that in the past we have had these debates about foreign policy where everything has come to a halt and all of America is focused on it, and all have been heard, that only occurs in times of crises. God forbid, were there an attack on NATO, it would be the focus of everyone in America. But it was not the focus even when Vandenberg was debating NATO in the late forties and before we voted on it. It is very hard to be proactive in a foreign policy initiative that is going to capture the imagination of the American

people. And it is not because they are not interested; it is because they are urgently attending to many other things. That is one of the reasons I think we have a representative government. I think that is one of the reasons why they look to us. I think that is part of our job description.

So to the extent that we could generate discussion and interest about this, I respectfully suggest under the leadership of Chairman HELMS of the Foreign Relations Committee, we have in fact engaged in a serious debate thus far. The closer we get to this final resolution, the more the public will focus on it. In fact, few foreign policy issues have been scrutinized as closely or as openly in public session as this has been in the 25 years that I have been here.

Beginning in 1994, the examination of the question of NATO enlargement by the Committee on Foreign Relations has been a well thought out and bipartisan effort. The committee's first hearings on NATO enlargement took place early in 1994. More hearings were held in 1995, and since October of 1997 the Foreign Relations Committee, under Chairman HELMS' leadership, has had no fewer than 8 extensive hearings, for a total of 12 in all. One of those hearings was held last fall and featured testimony from 15 American citizens, many of whom represent grassroots civics groups interested in NATO.

I would like to publicly commend the Senator, who is on the floor now, Senator HELMS, for the strong and able leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in building bipartisan support for membership of these three candidate countries and for helping to craft a bipartisan resolution for the protocols of accession.

It is also important to note that three other Senate committees—the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and the Budget Committee—have also held hearings on NATO enlargement. The Armed Services Committee filed a report with the Foreign Relations Committee recommending certain understandings which the Foreign Relations Committee has taken into account in developing the resolution of ratification of the protocols of accession that we voted out 16 to 2.

The Intelligence Committee filed a report that favorably assesses the intent and ability of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to protect classified military and intelligence information which would be provided them as NATO members—something we are all concerned about. We have not taken this thing on face value or willy-nilly. We had the committee of jurisdiction thoroughly look at it. They concluded that they would in fact be trustworthy members.

From the very outset of 1994, the Foreign Relations Committee made certain that voices in favor of NATO enlargement as well as voices against enlargement would be heard equally and

fairly. I believe this decision was essential for the committee members to get all sides of the argument. I will not go into the details at this moment of which witnesses addressed which arguments except to say that a glance at the list of witnesses reflects the extraordinary effort we made at balance. Many of the leaders of both the proenlargement and antienlargement camps were represented before our committee. And 2 months ago, in mid-January, the Committee on Foreign Relations published a 552-page document entitled: "The Debate on NATO Enlargement." The compendium contained the full testimonies of witnesses from the seven hearings of the committee from October to November of 1997, questions from members of the committee and witnesses' responses and a good deal of additional material received for the record. It included the reprinting of lengthy articles against enlargement by Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, of Johns Hopkins University, one of the leading opponents of enlargement, and the report of a fact-finding trip that I took late last year to Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, to give you the extent, and a lot more is covered. I am not suggesting that my report is any more or less significant than what Dr. Mandelbaum or anyone else testified to, but I am making the larger point that it is extensive.

Mr. President, it is possible that some aspects of the NATO enlargement question are not covered in this 552-page compendium, but I do not know of any, and I have spent, along with my colleagues in the Chamber, literally hundreds of hours attempting to educate myself on this subject, with 25 years of experience. The document I have referred to was sent to all 100 Senators with an accompanying letter from Senator HELMS and me.

In short, all the issues have been out there for a long time for any interested party to study. Moreover, the legislative record of the Senate testifies to a longstanding engagement with NATO enlargement. In 1994, 1995 and 1996 the Senate debated and approved legislation in favor of NATO enlargement. On July 25, 1996, by an 81-to-16 vote, the Senate approved legislation stating that "The admission to NATO of emerging democracies in central and Eastern Europe, which are found to be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, would contribute to international peace and contribute to the security of the region."

Last April, by agreement, the majority leader, Senator LOTT, and the minority leader, Senator DASCHLE, established the NATO Senate observer group to facilitate close interaction with the executive branch as plans for NATO enlargement went forward.

Now, I cite this only to demonstrate that not only have we gone out of our way to look at the arguments for and against, but this group that was set up

with Senator ROTH, my senior colleague from Delaware, and me as the cochairs, that traveled with the President—not just the two of us but others, including the Senator from Nebraska—spent an inordinate amount of time with the administration, whether it was with the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President himself, or the Vice President, so that we knew what was going on during the negotiations relative to who might be invited.

On July 25, 1996, by a vote of 81 to 16, the Senate approved legislation stating that "Admission to NATO of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which are found to be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty, would contribute to international peace and contribute to the security of the region."

I repeat that for a second time because that was back in July of 1996. Last April, as I indicated, the leaders of both parties set up this NATO observer group. Twenty-eight Senators, 14 in each party, were named to the observer group, and as I said, Senator ROTH has demonstrated a strong commitment and leadership as chairman of this group. Since then, the observer group has held no fewer than 17 meetings with the administration, NATO and other foreign officials. Members met with President Clinton, Secretaries Albright and Cohen, National Security Adviser Berger, and many other high ranking civilian and military officials. Members of the Senate NATO observer group have met with the Presidents of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and their Foreign Ministers. They have met with NATO's Secretary General Solana; they have met with NATO Chiefs of Defense, and the chairman of the NATO military committee. Some have actually met and addressed the NATO PermRep group that met here earlier in the year. We have met with the chiefs of staff of each of the present NATO members. There have been significant encounters.

The observer group was represented in a delegation to the signing of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia in Paris in May of 1997. The Senate observer group was also represented in the U.S. delegation to the NATO summit in Madrid in July, and I would like to repeat that 28 Senators are members of this observer group.

When we add to that the number of other Senators who are members of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and Budget Committees, all of which have held hearings on NATO enlargement, we find that no fewer than 74 Senators have been exposed more than tangentially to the issue of NATO enlargement through one or more committees or the Senate NATO observer group—nearly three-quarters of the entire Senate. That is quite a remarkable fact, which I submit definitely puts to rest the charge that this issue lacks study.

I challenge any of my colleagues to name me another major issue where 75 Members of the Senate have gotten themselves, through specific assignments, more involved in the details. To me, it is abundantly clear that consideration of the Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement upon which we are embarked today is the culmination of several years of detailed scrutiny and debate within the Senate. As a matter of fact, my good friend and worthy opponent on occasion, although we agree more than we disagree, the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia and I, even as long ago as last—I don't know how long ago it was now—found ourselves debating before a group of very distinguished—it wasn't an intended debate, but we ended up with, I thought, an informative and thoughtful debate before a group of leading citizens in the State of Connecticut at the behest of our friend, Senator DODD. So we are not new to this, Mr. President, notwithstanding the fact this will be news to some members of the press and it will be news to some members of the public. But the notion that we have not taken it seriously and it needs more time, I think, is unfounded.

That is not to suggest that it would not warrant taking a lot of time in the Chamber. I think that is totally appropriate because this is ultimately the forum where the folks actually get a look at what we are doing. No one followed us to Madrid or to Paris. No one was involved in that room in the Dirksen Building when the Senator and I exchanged views before a group of Connecticut voters. But the truth of the matter is this is the forum to do that. And knowing my friend from Virginia, who is on his feet and in the Chamber, it will be spirited and it will be an informative debate, at least from his perspective, from his side of the argument.

Mr. President, I think it is abundantly clear the consideration of the NATO resolution of ratification for enlargement upon which we have embarked today is a culmination of several years of detailed scrutiny and debate within the Senate. I would like, now, to turn to some of the arguments against enlargement or for qualifications on enlargement, and then explain why I do not find them very convincing.

Some say that since the Soviet Union is but a dead memory, some would suggest a bad memory, that there are no longer any threats to democratic Europe. Others maintain that because the Pacific rim and Latin America have gained in importance, we should scale down our commitment of resources to Europe and devote them more to the Pacific rim.

Some of my colleagues worry that NATO enlargement may strengthen the nationalists and Communists, the Reds and the browns, within Russia and draw new dividing lines in Europe. Recently, fears have been voiced that NATO enlargement is open-ended and, hence, out of control. Opponents of

NATO's involvement in Bosnia see it as an open-ended and dangerous model for future out-of-area NATO commitments, an expression put forward in a very articulate manner by my colleague from Missouri who is on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Finally, on an issue that concerns us all, opponents assert that the cost NATO enlargement is going to require is not clear at best and exorbitant probably. Some fear that the cost of enlargement will fall disproportionately on the United States. All of these arguments against are important and, I submit, can be answered satisfactorily, but clearly must be answered.

I submit, first of all, without minimizing the importance of Asia and Latin America, that Europe remains the vital area of interest to the United States for political, strategic, economic and, yes, cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and a partner of the United States.

In economic terms, the European Union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined GDP that exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger and, I might add, less balanced trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest more in Europe. In fact, we have more direct investments in Europe than in any other area of the world, an amount in excess of \$250 billion.

Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly educated work forces and, as President Clinton said in his message of transmittal of the protocols of accession, they "have helped to make Central Europe the continent's most robust zone of economic growth."

The three candidate countries already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most Americans trace their cultural roots to Europe and millions retain personal ties to it. By any geographical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe.

How might that instability occur, Mr. President? No one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany, NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. The Russian Army is in such pitiful shape that it could not even reconquer little Chechnya, a part of the Russian Federation.

Nonetheless, some say that someday Russia will regain her military might, and if democratization there does not succeed, NATO might, once again, be democratic Europe's insurance policy against reemergence of a hegemonic power, as is outlined in declaration 2 of the resolution of ratification.

For the foreseeable future, however, the primary threats to stability in Europe are different, although no less real, than those of the cold war. We all know what they are. They are ethnic and religious hatred, as horrifyingly

shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, and brutalized in Bosnia and most recently in Kosovo. They are the well-organized forces of international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles. The history of the 20th century has demonstrated that the United States must—and I emphasize "must"—play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe.

In World War I and World War II, and lately in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without American leadership, the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully. While American idealism has certainly played a role in our various interventions to rescue Europe, enlightened self-interest has been our dominant motive.

Put simply, it is in the vital interest of the United States of America that stability be preserved in Europe, not only because Europe itself is of central importance, but also in order that, when necessary, we are free to concentrate our assets on problems in other areas of the world.

How does this need for security in Europe translate into 1998 terms? It means that we must lead the Europeans to create what is called in the current foreign policy jargon a new security architecture of interlocking organizations with NATO at its core. Of primary importance is that this policy will guarantee stability to Central Europe, where newly independent states are striving to create and solidify political democracy and free markets. This is a very difficult process, subject to destabilizing forces like ethnic antagonisms, economic downturns, international crime, and, in some cases, thinly disguised foreign pressure. It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen.

During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies, like France and Germany, were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies. It was the framework under which former pariahs, like Germany, Italy, and Spain, could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that on several occasions helped keep the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating into full warfare.

The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move that zone of stability eastward to Central Europe and thereby deter external destabilization, prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating, and forestall a scramble for new bilateral-multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930s from occurring in the 1990s and the next century. This is the strategic rationale for enlargement laid out in detail in declaration 2 of the resolution of ratification. In fact, the zone of stability is already developing.

As I mentioned earlier, in anticipation of NATO membership, several Central and East European countries have settled longstanding disputes. I need

only mention Hungary and Romania, Slovenia and Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, and there are other examples I will go into detail about later. If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. It is a certainty. The policy option for today is not, as it is often phrased, enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo is simply not an option over the next several years.

Mr. President, there is one additional argument for NATO enlargement which may have fallen out of fashion, and I am going to mention it now at the risk of engaging this debate in a different direction, and that is the moral argument—the moral argument.

For 40 years, the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the heel of Communist oppressors—40 years. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it seems to me it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified.

In my view, not to do so out of an excessive fear of antagonizing Russia would accord Moscow a special sphere of influence in Central Europe, essentially validating the division of Europe at Yalta. For me, such a course is unthinkable. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all made tremendous efforts to meet NATO's stringent membership requirements, and, based on my reckoning, they have succeeded.

Not even the opponents of enlargement can dispute that fact. Hence, as declaration 4 of the resolution of ratification reaffirms, the three new members will have all the rights, privileges, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded all other NATO members. There is no second-class citizenship in NATO.

Ironically, within the fruits of NATO's unparalleled success lie the seeds of its possible demise. Alliances are formed to fight wars or to deter them. Once the adversary is gone, unless alliances adapt to meet changing threats, they lose their *raison d'être*, they lose their reason for being. Thus, enlargement must be accompanied by a fine-tuning of NATO's so-called strategic concept last revisited in 1991.

The alliance's primary mission, outlined in article 5 of the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, remains the same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all and responding through the use of armed forces, if necessary.

Condition 1 of the resolution of ratification underscores that the core purpose of NATO remains collective defense. In addition, since the end of the cold war, non-article 5 missions, like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have become possible. The SFOR joint effort in

Bosnia with Russia and several other non-NATO countries is an excellent example.

To the critics who see our involvement in Bosnia as a harbinger of future NATO peacekeeping engagements or, from their point of view, entanglements, I would only say the success in Bosnia will provide the best deterrent to future ethnic cleansers and aggressors and, thereby, reduce the likelihood that American troops will have to be used in combat in Europe.

Condition 1 of the resolution of ratification foresees article 4 missions on a case-by-case basis only when there is a consensus in NATO and that there is a threat to the security interests of the alliance members. Through briefings required by condition 1, the executive branch will have to keep the Senate informed of any discussions in NATO to change or revise their strategic concept.

Some critics might ask why the Europeans can't take care of their own problems. First of all, Europeans should shoulder three-quarters of the common funded cost of NATO and furnish an even higher percentage of the alliance's troops. Both our current NATO allies and the candidate countries have agreed to shoulder their fair share of financial costs and all mutual obligations connected with enlargement.

In order to guarantee a continuation of this alliance burdensharing, condition 2 of the resolution of ratification mandates an annual report by the President containing detailed, country-specific data on the contributions of all NATO members. It also requires that the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary not increase the percentage share of the United States to the common budgets of NATO.

To my colleagues who are understandably concerned about possible hollowing out of our worldwide military capability—by that I mean they argue that expanding NATO and the additional resources required will require us to take military resources to other parts of the world, meaning they will have a hollow capability in other parts of the world, thereby, in an overall sense, reducing our security—those who are concerned about this possible hollowing out of our worldwide military capability, I draw your attention to another element of condition 2 of the resolution of ratification which directs the President to certify that NATO enlargement will not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military requirements outside the NATO area.

I know that many of my colleagues are concerned about the enlargement's effect upon our erstwhile cold war enemy Russia. I firmly believe that NATO enlargement will not adversely affect U.S. relations with the Russian Federation. As I indicated earlier, I came to that conclusion following a trip to Moscow and several European capitals last year and subsequent discussions on that topic.

Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in Moscow have come to terms with the first round. Moreover, no Russian I met with, from Communist leader Zyuganov to liberal leader Yavlinsky to the nationalist leader Lebed, none of them believe that NATO enlargement constitutes a security threat to Russia.

In fact, nearly all politicians and experts with whom I met understood the nonaggressiveness implicit in NATO's two recent declarations on nuclear and conventional forces. In the famous "three noes," the alliance declared that it has no reason, intention, or plan in the current or foreseeable security environment to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states and no forces to do that, no forces, in the future.

Similarly, NATO stated that in the current environment, it would not permanently station substantial combat forces of the 16 members on Polish, Czech or Hungarian soil. Rather, the Kremlin's public opposition to enlargement is largely—largely—a psychological question connected with the loss of empire, wounded pride and, most importantly, an uncertainty about Russia's place in the world of the 21st century. The Russian Ambassador in Washington reiterated this psychological problem in a newspaper article just last week.

As part of this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about their country being marginalized, and as a result, they are eager to move forward with its bilateral relationship with the United States.

We must continue to engage Russia politically, militarily, economically, and culturally. Declaration 5 of the resolution of ratification specifically endorses this "new and constructive relationship" with the Russian Federation.

The Clinton administration, together with our NATO allies, has already begun to do just that. The NATO-Russian Founding Act signed in Paris last May is a good start at binding Russia closer to the West and soothing its bruised feelings.

The Founding Act, however, in no way gives Moscow a decisionmaking role in NATO's core structures like the North Atlantic Council, as condition 3 of the resolution specifically explains.

The purely consultative mandate of the new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council does not mean that it cannot evolve into a truly valuable mechanism for promoting mutual trust.

As Russian officials better understand that NATO is not a rapacious caricature of Soviet propaganda, but rather a defensive alliance and force for security and stability in Europe, their animosity toward the organization may dissipate. And by working together in the Permanent Joint Council, Russia can prove that it is a responsible partner for the West.

Through this mechanism and others, over time Moscow can come to realize

that enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe will increase her own security, not diminish it.

It is also essential that arms control agreements with Russia be ratified and expanded.

Of special importance is getting the state дума, their parliament, to ratify the START II treaty and then, together with the United States, to move on to further reductions in START III.

The statement last week made by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin that he would push for дума ratification of START II is another clear sign that NATO enlargement does not stand in the way of arms control.

The nationalist and Communist objections to START II predate even a discussion of NATO enlargement, and I might add that in my meeting with Chernomyrdin, even though he and I got into a heated discussion about Iran, he never once suggested that expanding NATO was going to diminish the prospects of ratification of START. I asked him, and others did, when he thought that would occur. Because it was a private meeting, I will not set the time or the date that he suggested. But I will assure you that he is of the view that ratification will occur.

Now, how does that square with those who say that talk of expansion is going to kill arms control? I managed, along with significant assistance from my friend from the State of Oregon, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We were told if we ratified that, the дума would never, if we went ahead and invited these three nations to join NATO, they would never ratify it.

While we were together in Spain, if I am not mistaken, with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of Defense and the Presidents of 15 other NATO nations, the дума either at that moment or shortly thereafter, by an overwhelming vote, ratified that arms control agreement. And now Chernomyrdin—to our friends who believe that NATO expansion will be damaging and cite him and his predecessor as a casualty of the talk of expansion—sat in a room just across the hall, the door I am pointing to, last week and talked about his certainty that there will be a ratification of the START agreement. As my brother would say, "Go figure." How does that justify the argument or make the case that this is going to kill cooperation with Russia on arms control?

The arguments against the START II predate any debate on NATO enlargement. The дума has shown, though, that it is willing to conclude agreements, as I have indicated, not only the Chemical Weapons Convention, but the Flank Document to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or the so-called CFE agreement. All have been ratified.

Condition 3 of the resolution of ratification reaffirms that the ongoing CFE talks are a venue for further con-

ventional arms control reductions, not the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Did you hear what I just said? That is an important, if I do say so myself, an important point. That is that if, in fact, Russia was determining everything through the prism of whether or not we are expanding NATO, why are they not insisting that further discussions on conventional arms be done through the NATO-Russia accord? Why are they continuing to use the mechanism that was in place? Why did they pass the Chemical Weapons Convention? Why does their Prime Minister believe they are going to ratify the START agreement? And even if they do not, why is he pushing it?

It is because they are wise enough to know it is not an offensive threat and wise enough to know that arms control agreements should be judged based upon whether, standing by themselves, they are in the interest of their country or not.

Although the Russians have all but officially acquiesced to the first round of NATO enlargement, they would, I acknowledge, have much more trouble with the admission in the future of some other countries in Europe, principally the Baltic states or Ukraine.

Critics of enlargement worry that the process is so open-ended that it is dangerous. It is true that the official policy of NATO as most recently enunciated in the 1997 Madrid summit, is the "open door"—and that is the official, enunciated policy—and that membership in the alliance is open to any European state, any European state that is in a position to further the principles of the NATO treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, and to contribute to the security of the alliance as a whole.

But it is equally true, as declaration 7 of the resolution of ratification unambiguously states, that other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented to invite any other country to join NATO in the future.

Moreover, according to declaration 7, the United States will not support such an invitation unless the President consults with the Senate according to constitutional procedures and the prospective NATO member can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership and its inclusion would serve the political and strategic interests of the United States.

This declaration, Mr. President, is crystal clear and not only refutes the critics of enlargement, but also obviates the need for any amendment that would impose an artificial pause upon the enlargement process after this round.

Such a condition would not only be superfluous, but would also have serious negative practical consequences. It would slam the door in the face of the several countries that in good faith are adjusting their policies to meet NATO requirements.

It would also arbitrarily rule out admission of already qualified countries

like Slovenia, a formal applicant, and Austria, which might reassess its neutrality after national elections next year.

The amendment that would postpone the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic until they are admitted to the European Union is also, in my view, fatally flawed. Declaration 6 of the resolution of ratification recognizes the EU as "an essential organization for economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe" and encourages the EU to expand its membership.

My friend from Oregon, who is on the floor, and I share a number of common views related to this, one of which is we have been individually—to the best of my knowledge, this is correct; and I will stand corrected, obviously, if I am not—either quietly chastising or publicly promoting our European friends to expand the EU membership. We think we have problems with American special interests. Well, in Europe it pales by comparison in terms of certain political groups within Europe who are not at all willing to expand. But it must expand.

So we do not argue with the need for the EU to expand. That is why in declaration 6 of the resolution of ratification, we cite the EU as an essential organization for economic, political, and social integration.

But the EU has a lengthy, complex admissions procedure, which employs criteria very different from those of NATO.

Let me end where I began. Why on Earth would the United States want to link fulfillment of our strategic goals to an organization in which we have no say and to which we do not even belong? Why would we do that? I do not understand that. Why would we say, yes, we know our interests are impacted upon. We are a European power. And the security architecture of Europe, whether you are for or against enlargement—we are all agreeing that is important. One of the reasons my friend from West Virginia is opposed is he says it will harm the security architecture. One of the reasons we are for it is we say it will enhance it.

Whether we are for or against it, why, in the Lord's name, would we say that whatever that architecture should be is going to be determined by an organization where we do not have a vote? I do not get that. I truly do not get that one.

Is that to say I do not think like the Senator from New York thinks, that the faster the EU is expanded, the more stability there will be in Europe? No. I agree with that. I agree with that. It is in our interest. It is also going to be a competitive problem down the road for us as well, but it is in our interest. But, my goodness, to say that the one thing we all agree on, NATO in its present form or altered state is the security architecture for Europe that is important to us, but its future we are going to

yield to an economic organization of which we are not a member and we have no vote—I find that absolutely incredible.

Now, I will end with this. This is my last statement, and I appreciate the indulgence of the colleagues. I warned my colleagues early on this was an opening statement and would take this long, and I am about to finish.

As for the argument that the addition of three new members would somehow render the alliance immobile in the face of all objective evidence, the Presiding Officer knows how this argument goes. My goodness, we have trouble enough getting 16 members together; adding 3 more, it will be harder to get consensus. This “doing business by consensus,” means everyone signs on. Therefore, it will be a lot harder. Therefore, that is the argument against enlargement.

I might add, by the way, if we are looking for certainty, we would not have expanded beyond the United States. We would have had great difficulty expanding anyway. I do not disregard this argument but it does fly in the face of all objective evidence.

The three previous rounds of NATO enlargement did not damage the cohesiveness of NATO, and there is every indication that the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians will be among America's most loyal allies. I will get myself in trouble for saying this, but were the French only as cooperative as the Hungarians. I pray the day comes that my French ancestors are as cooperative as are the Hungarians. Or, I doubt whether we will see the day when the internal differences between the Poles and the Hungarians, divided by other countries, separated by other countries, will have disagreements that equal those that exist within Greece and Turkey at the moment. These three new nations, if anything, will strengthen our position within NATO as well as strengthen NATO.

In considering the ratification of NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the Senate has a historic opportunity to enhance the security of the United States of America by extending the zone of stability and peace in Europe.

Mr. President, I look forward to our debate on this resolution of ratification, which I truly believe protects American interests and American leadership within NATO. At its base, you will detect, not from my friend from Virginia, I want to make this clear, but I predict to you on the floor, you will find an undercurrent here that really, if phrased correctly, would be stated this way: Why do we need NATO? Much of the debate about expansion is really the debate about the efficacy and need of an organization, the one we have now.

I note parenthetically if my friends say why expand NATO when there is no threat in Europe, I ask the rhetorical question, why continue to have NATO if there is no threat in Europe?

I see my friend from Virginia is on his feet. I welcome his comments or questions, but I will yield the floor to give anyone else an opportunity to speak, if they wish. But I want to make it clear to my friend I am not retreating from the field; I will stay here if he wishes to engage me.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I just wanted to reaffirm what the Senator has said. But I want to make it clear that the Senator listed 74 Senators by count who have dealt with the issue. But let us not infer from that that that is the count at the present time that favors this. I just wanted to make that clear because I am a member of the NATO observer group. It has been a vital organization. Seventeen times we have met. And under the leadership of Senator BIDEN and Senator ROTH, I think we have done a lot of valuable analysis which is shared with the rest of the Senate.

In our weekly luncheon we had some 35 to 40 Republican Senators. We had Peter Rodman, of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York City, and the privilege of debating with him in New York on this issue on Monday. We had Michael Mandelbaum, and the Presiding Officer will recall here in the last hour we had a heated debate in our caucus on this issue. So this vital issue has now gained the momentum that I think it deserves and I believe in the ensuing days—and our leader, Senator LOTT, just spoke with us and wants to move along in an orderly process but no way attenuate the ability of the Senate to give this question every bit of attention it needs.

I think it is important that our distinguished colleague has brought up chronologically exactly what has been done by the Senate thus far, and now we embark on the debate that I think will be an excellent one.

Momentarily, I will deliver some general remarks on this subject, but at this time I cannot resist the effort, since we have had such a pleasure debating, to give to you once again the opportunity to answer the question I think I posed in our last debate. And I will be but a minute posing the question.

That is, Mr. President, this NATO alliance is perhaps the most valuable alliance in the history of the world, when nations came together in a period of uncertainty, under the leadership of one of the greatest Presidents, greatest Presidents this country ever had, Harry S. Truman. He listed in his biography his two proudest accomplishments were the Marshall Plan and NATO. At that time the President and others, the founding fathers of this alliance, made clear that it was a military alliance, it was for a military reason that we put this there, to deter any further aggression in Europe.

Today, in my judgment, I do not see any military threat to the three nations under consideration. What I do see is that that arc of nations, beginning with Poland going down through

Bulgaria on the Black Sea, are in a struggle for economic survival, making the transition from the Warsaw Pact to a system of competition, not only among themselves but worldwide, to establish a free market economy, to establish the political democracies and the like.

That is the focus of their attention. That is where all their resources for the time being should be applied. And now we are considering the admission of three. I say to my distinguished colleague that, should the Senate in its wisdom vote to affirm the ratification and the status of NATO is given to 3 of the 12, are we not singling out 3 of these countries and giving them a tremendous lift in that competitive field among the 12 nations for economic competition? They can put in their brochures as they go throughout the world, come, invest, put your investment in our country, because you have the security of the NATO alliance, the security of knowing that, if anything were to threaten our nation, your investment will be protected. Whereas, if you go next door to Romania, if you go next door to Slovenia or the other nations, they pose some doubt as to whether or not, if a problem arose which was in the circumference of the obligation of the NATO—primarily article 5, but at a later time I will explain where I think NATO is moving in terms of a broader issue of responsibilities, Bosnia being the case in point—if that threat comes, your investment is protected in the three countries. And we question whether or not it will be protected as well in other nations not now being admitted to NATO.

Suddenly you begin to breed a friction and a concern amongst these countries, side by side, border by border; and that friction alone could spell trouble. I ask my friend.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be delighted to answer.

Let me make one prefatory comment. My reference to 74, 75 Senators being exposed to this issue is in no way to imply that all 75 or 74 were in favor of expansion. I know, with men of the caliber of the Senator from Virginia, and the man who I think is one of the most informed people in the Senate that I have ever served with, my friend from New York, Senator MOYNIHAN, I know with their doubts about expansion that this is far from a certain outcome. So I do not mean to imply that all who were exposed were in favor. I was responding, before the Senator came to the floor, to the assertions made in the press that this has not been given due consideration by Members of the Senate.

Let me go specifically to the question that was asked; then I will finish my statement and will be happy to yield then or engage in a colloquy or take questions. That is I, too, agree that Harry Truman was one of the great Presidents and Harry Truman did say that one of his two greatest achievements was NATO. He said the

reason NATO was necessary was a moment of uncertainty in world history. I respectfully suggest if there has ever been a moment of uncertainty, and I might add "in world history," it is today.

I spoke at my hometown, my birth town, of Scranton, PA, last night to an organization called the Friendly Sons of Saint Patrick, where my great grandfather was a founder in 1902, a State Senator named Edward Blewitt, and I quoted William Butler Yeats' poem "Easter 1916," where he concluded by saying the world is changed. "All changed, changed utterly: A terrible beauty is born." He is talking about "the rising," as we Irish Catholics refer to it, the rising on Easter Sunday in 1916.

I would paraphrase that by saying: With the fall of the wall, a terrible beauty has been born. It is a new world. The world has changed utterly.

Although it is a different threat, although it is a different concern, although it is not amassed forces of the Warsaw Pact lining up to flow through the Fulda gap to take over West Germany, it is a different enemy. The different enemy is uncertainty. The different enemy is instability. The different enemy is nations seeking to define themselves and their futures and their security relative to one another in an area of the world—I will get in real trouble with my European friends for saying this—where the degree of political maturation has not moved to the point that I have confidence they will reach the right decision without our involvement in that process. So, the same circumstance, uncertainty, exists today as existed in 1946, 1947, and 1948—uncertainty.

Second, the Senator asked, Is this a military alliance? It is a military alliance. That is why I hope we will continue to treat it as a military alliance and reject this facile argument being promoted by some, put forward by some of my friends who are among the most respected former Members of the U.S. Senate, who say they should join the EU before they join NATO.

If this is a military alliance, why in the heck do they have to join an economic union before they join the military alliance? It is a military alliance. I might add, we have not asked anyone else to do that. It is beyond me why we would ask, why we would put the fate of the military architecture of Europe in the hands of an economic organization of which we are not a member, have no vote, and have no ability to shape, essentially giving these other European nations the ability to veto our ability to put together this new architecture for security in Europe.

But to the very specific point the Senator raised, what about the notion that we are inviting Hungary but not Romania? Are we creating this dynamic where we gave Hungary a great boost up and Romania essentially is pushed down in relative terms? I will go into great detail to respond to that

as the debate goes on, but in the interests of getting on with the rest of my statement, let me answer it with a question: If the countries that border the countries that are being invited are going to be put at such a disadvantage, I would ask the question, why do they all favor the expansion? Why did Romania favor—favor, now, notwithstanding the fact they fought to be invited and were not—why do they favor Hungarian membership? Why do the Germans favor Polish membership? Why are all the countries that sought admission thus far in favor of the three countries that were granted the opportunity to prove they were ready to join?

I would add one further fact. The corollary to that question would be: Are we then going to be placed in the position of either having to embrace all the former Soviet Union in one fell swoop as members of NATO whether they are ready or not, or none? Because if you take the logical extension of my friend's argument, it leads you to only one of two conclusions: Either every country seeking admission should be admitted at the very same moment, thereby not allowing one to have the perceived advantage my friend from Virginia says occurs with membership, or the perceived disadvantage of not being a member—you either admit them all at once, which I am positive he does not support, absolutely positive, or you admit none. You have no alternative.

So I say respectfully to my friend, this is a dynamic situation. The world is changing rapidly. We do not have the ability to freeze-frame the world and say now we are in one broad stroke going to redefine, in this case the security architecture of Europe, with finality. That's it.

That is not the history of NATO. When NATO started, Germany was not part of NATO. Germany was not part of NATO. It would have been reasonable to ask why do we have a NATO with no Germany? It was equally reasonable to ask why in the devil would you have Germany part of NATO at the time? When we brought in Germany, we did not say bringing in Germany puts Turkey and Greece at a disadvantage. We did not say that. When we brought in Turkey and Greece, we did not say Spain will be hurt badly. One of the problems with foreign policy is that it reflects life writ large. There is nothing neat about it. Notwithstanding what many of my academic friends enjoy doing, we are not able to come up with a universal construct that in one fell swoop can be materialized.

I suggest to my friend, the invitation to Hungary has produced democratization internally within Romania, a consequence that was not anticipated by anybody 2 years ago. So, instead of, for example, Hungary being invited and Romania being outraged and having their policy move toward totalitarianism and away from democracy, the exact opposite happened. It created a

dynamic effect. I am not here to tell any of my colleagues that I can predict with certainty what the dynamism will produce. I have served here sufficiently long to be sufficiently humble to know that I do not possess that capacity. But I do suggest that we can play the odds, and the odds are this is a pretty good bet, an overwhelming good bet.

So, my response, and I will go into it in more detail as the debate goes on, but my response is that if I accept the proposition put forward by my colleague in the way in which the question was phrased, then I am left with a conundrum of either everybody or nobody. And I, to paraphrase Russell Long when he used to kid around, "I ain't for nobody, but I also ain't for everybody right now."

So I think this is a rational, relatively predictable—to the extent anything can be on the world stage—and useful incremental development of an architecture that hopefully will take us for another 50 years with peace and security in Europe like the last architecture.

I will note here, parenthetically, I do not think the choice is expand or status quo. I think the choice is expansion or atrophy, and I will go into that in a later moment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if he will yield just that I may thank my colleague for responding to the question. I hope in due course we can have a further colloquy, but I want to make it clear I just think it is not wise to take this great treaty at this time and put in those three countries. Therefore, I am for the "nobody" at the moment.

Mr. BIDEN. I understand.

Mr. WARNER. But I am somewhat astounded that you say it is either nobody or everybody, because I think you invite the conclusion that directly supports my argument, that by admitting three, the others are put at a severe disadvantage economically.

(Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)

Mr. WARNER. While I do have a statement I wish to deliver, I will pick up on several of the themes by my distinguished colleague from Delaware and we would go right into a colloquy on concerns that I have, and perhaps others have.

First, I say we are fortunate in the Senate to have had the strong participation by the Senator from Delaware. This is my 19th year of service in the Senate. We have traveled together to many places in the world, and we are fortunate that he has chosen to be the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is appalling to me today to see the decline in the interest in strategic issues, be they foreign affairs or security issues all across the country, and to some extent here in the Congress of the United States. Year after year, Senator BIDEN has been right there in the forefront on this floor as one of the most vigorous and enthusiastic debaters, albeit somewhat long-winded on occasion, but nevertheless, solid in his enthusiasm.

So with that modest background, I pick up on the theme, why NATO? I say to my good friend, as he well knows, in 1917 we responded and the Yankees crossed the oceans in response to the plea, "Come to save us." The great powers of Europe and Great Britain were locked in a war of static dimensions, devouring tens upon tens of thousands of lives every day, and we went, and I think all the world acknowledges we were the power that tipped the balance for the allies in that struggle that enabled victory and to have peace return to Europe. And, again, as the clouds of war over the world in 1939, September, when Hitler invaded Poland, and we watched Great Britain heroically trying to put its thumb in the dike, and France and the Maginot Line was overrun in just a matter of days or weeks, and Europe was in the palm of Hitler's hand.

Once again, this country, which had really bordered upon isolationism in 1939 and 1940, suddenly after Pearl Harbor stood united, under a courageous President's leadership and once again returned to Europe.

We are there in Europe today because of the classic, historic instability among those major nations. Our presence in Europe is essential to its long-range stability. No one puts that upon the billboards, nor should they. But that is understood subliminally by those who have studied that history and, indeed, the European leaders today.

NATO gives the United States the legitimacy to be in Europe. We are now considering the NATO treaty which has made possible that legitimacy for over 50 years. That is the most fundamental reason why I oppose enlarging it at this time. It puts in jeopardy the ability of the United States to have that strong voice that is so essential in Europe.

I ask my colleague a question or two before I go on in my statement. He made the statement that Russian leaders have more or less tacitly accepted the expansion of NATO. I want to be accurate in my rendition of his words, but I seek clarification of his statement, because on my recent trip to Russia with Secretary Cohen we had the opportunity to visit with the Sergeyev, Minister of Defense and with Primakov, the very able Foreign Minister. I really think that Primakov is the second coming of Gromyko. This man has enormous potential and possibility to become a future leader of Russia.

My point to the Senator is, as I listened to those two members of the Yeltsin Cabinet address the issue of expansion of NATO, it is true that they have reconciled themselves to these first three countries, but I clearly came away with the impression that that is the line that is to be drawn. I want to make clear to my colleague that it is those three countries, and once another step is taken to access others, then I think there will be fur-

ther instability in relationships between the United States and Russia.

Now let me make it clear, and I will yield for the answer, at no time should this country ever consider Russia in terms of making those decisions which are important to our vital security interests—at no time. We should always put our vital security interests first. But we cannot be unmindful of the fact that on a broad range of fronts we are engaged with Russia today, not the least of which is further reduction of the ever-present nuclear threat. We are assisting, through the Nunn-Lugar funds, the dismantling of their weapons. We are assisting them with downsizing their military because this is the 14th consecutive year of the downsizing of the American military. We have a lot of experience in dealing with downsizing.

I am not sure that it has been that wise, that decision, and I am one who wants to see what we can do to start that curve back up. That is a separate issue for another day.

I want to ask my good friend to clarify, when he said Russia has accepted it, whether or not it is limited to the first three and the balance of the nine that wish to join—and I don't think in the current rhetoric we are using, Ukraine is within that nine. You might wish to clarify that. That would be 10 according to my calculation.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, in response, as the Senator will see in the RECORD, what I said was they have accepted the first round, explicit in terms of the first round.

The second point is I may have misled the Senator, but unintentionally, when I talked about the NATO nations of the former Soviet bloc nations that were seeking admission. I do not include Ukraine in that.

Third, the Senator is absolutely correct that there is talk in and among, in Russia and among Russian leaders, about no second round.

The Senator then went on to say that under no circumstance should we give them a veto right over any security question. That is why I believe that the amendment he is considering would be very, very unwise. I think if he concludes it is not in our overall interest, and by that I mean including our relations with Russia not to have a second round, we should not have a second round. We should make that decision ourselves. We should not preempt that decision by essentially yielding to the concern expressed by Russian leaders today, because I respectfully suggest—and who knows whether the Senator and I will still be here; he may be, I may not—when the full integration of these three countries occurs, I predict to you there will be a very different circumstance in Russia 3 years from today than there is today. It is not static.

We assume that there is a dynamism of what is happening in the West and in Central Europe as if there is no dynamism in Moscow or in Russia. I ac-

knowledge that could turn sour, but I think there is even a better chance it will turn positive.

I would not want us to preempt ahead of time, prematurely, unnecessarily, appearing to be yielding to the most conservative elements in Russia, giving them an upper hand in the debate in the Duma, by us going on record of first establishing the membership of three new countries, and in the same breath saying "but we will not do anymore." I guarantee you if that occurs, I am prepared to bet any one of you that within a 24-hour period that the Duma is in session, you will have the allies of Mr. Zyuganov standing on the floor saying, "If only Yeltsin had done what we did and told the Americans we would not stand for a second round," he would have gotten the result we got. I respectfully suggest that if you don't want to expand, make the case in here. If you don't want to expand any further, see to it that does not occur by importuning our President and this body, but not formally going on record at this time to say that, yes, these three, but no more for a time certain. So I hope that answers the Senator's question.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might summarize, then the Senator's remarks earlier about Russia are confined to the three under current consideration?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes. If I may be precise, when I said that I found no one of the major political leaders in Moscow viewing the expansion of NATO as a security threat to them, I was referring explicitly to the first round. That included the prospect of four nations at the time, not just three. There was no concern expressed by anyone to whom I spoke, including the think tank folks in the Russian-American—my friends from Virginia or New York may remember what it was called.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Canadian-American.

Mr. BIDEN. The Canadian-American department. Even among them, there was no concern. As a matter of fact, there was a sense of bravado when they would say, "obviously, this is no security threat to us, but. . . ." The "but" would come in and the "but" always related to something along the lines of: This is an attempt on your part to isolate us, an attempt on your part to keep us from becoming full members of the economy to the West; or this is an attempt on your part to humiliate us, but not a security threat.

So I was speaking to the prospect of four nations, only three of which are being invited here. I was not talking about the Balts, Ukraine, Belarus, or other countries that could, theoretically, come up in a 2nd, 3rd, 5th, or 15th round.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. A 2nd, 3rd, 5th, or 15th round. It is interesting that he mentioned four. This round almost included that fourth country.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, at some point in our debate, maybe the Senator would opine as to how long before that fourth country, who just missed this round by a hair, might be considered for admission, and whether or not this second round will come far more swiftly than anyone at the present time expects. It is for that reason that my good friend, the senior Senator from New York, and I have an amendment, which at some point we will call up, suggesting that this body ought to go on record and have a moratorium attached, whereby a 3-year period will elapse, should this body vote this treaty accession, before the next round.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will respond briefly. Speaking for only myself, I believe that my colleagues are correct. There is no urgency to move to the next round. But I point out that, from my perspective, I think the position we should be taking is not a formal position that belies the principle of saying anybody who is ready can come forward; I say that we should say that there will be no second round until all these three nations are fully integrated into NATO's integrated command structure. No one suggests that is likely to occur in less than a couple of years, and most think it will be like it was for Spain, Turkey, Greece, and like it was for Germany—several years.

My deceased wife used to say something. I will never forget, when we were a young married couple, we were visiting another couple and we had two young children a year and a day apart, 2 months old and 14 months old. We were with this other couple we had gone to school with and they had their young child there. The husband and wife began to argue about what college they wanted her to go to, this 12-month-old child. My wife, who had great wisdom, said this as we were riding home in the car: "Let's make a pact never to argue about anything that requires a decision not to occur for at least a decade." So from that point on, we used to say when we got into an argument, "this is about college and they are only in grade school," and that was our code phrase for, Look, when the time comes, we can settle that; why fight about that? We have enough to disagree on now.

I respectfully suggest that "this is about college." Let's wait until that time comes. Don't prejudge it. Don't artificially set limits on it because then you send a different message. I want the Romanian Government, which has been on good behavior for the first time in five decades or longer—I want the Romanian Government out there, just like my 16-year-old daughter, saying, "If I behave this weekend, maybe I'll get the car next weekend." I want the Romanian Government out there saying, No, it could not happen tomorrow, or it may not happen for a month, or for 3 years, but I know it won't happen if we don't con-

tinue to treat this Hungarian minority properly, et cetera. Why set these artificial limits? Let's not argue about what college our daughter is going to go to when she is only 2 years old. It is going to take 2 to 3 years to fully integrate the three countries in question. So I think the Senator will get his wish regardless of whether or not an amendment is passed. I just think we are begging for trouble by setting artificial limits.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague. I am going to make certain that I get these words out of the RECORD and preserve them for posterity that he feels it would be many, many years before another round comes. Perhaps during the course of this debate he might comment on why did the President of the United States then encourage the Baltics and have this agreement—whatever that agreement is called—issued here, to the astonishment of many of us just a matter of 2, 3 months ago. Why did he throw that lifeline out?

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, he did not promise them anything. He threw a lifeline out because the Europeans threw no lifeline out, because the Europeans didn't do what my friend from New York is encouraging them to do. They did not step forward. They were irresponsible in their unwillingness to invite the Balts to become part of the European Community. They finally, about a month and a half ago, at the same time they kicked Turkey in the teeth, extended a belated invitation that is somewhat attenuated. But that is the reason the President did that.

We are looking for stability. Stability. I don't want anyone in the Balts, I don't want anyone in Ukraine, I don't even want anyone in Belarus, which is still a totalitarian country, concluding that there is no hope. I don't want to falsely hold out hope for them. The reason why, I assume, the President said what he said relative to the Balts was to dampen, not to inflame the debate here about whether or not the Balts were being shortchanged by not being brought in. I have just been handed something by my staff here, and I have been here so long I need glasses. It must be very insightful.

Mr. WARNER. It is probably from the Baltic charter, which is rather—
Mr. BIDEN. But the Baltic charter didn't promise NATO membership to Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, JANUARY 16, 1998

A CHARTER OF PARTNERSHIP AMONG THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RE-
PUBLIC OF ESTONIA, REPUBLIC OF LATVIA,
AND REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

PREAMBLE

The United States of America, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and

the Republic of Lithuania, hereafter referred to as Partners.

Sharing a common vision of a peaceful and increasingly integrated Europe, free of divisions, dedicated to democracy, the rule of law, free markets, and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people;

Recognizing the historic opportunity to build a new Europe, in which each state is secure in its internationally-recognized borders and respects the independence and territorial integrity of all members of the transatlantic community;

Determined to strengthen their bilateral relations as a contribution to building this new Europe, and to enhance the security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement of European and transatlantic institutions;

Committee to the full development of human potential within just and inclusive societies attentive to the promotion of harmonious and equitable relations among individuals belonging to diverse ethnic and religious groups;

Avowing a common interest in developing cooperative, mutually respectful relations with all other states in the region;

Recalling the friendly relations that have been continuously maintained between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania since 1922;

Further recalling that the United States of America never recognized the forcible incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR in 1940 but rather regards their statehood as uninterrupted since the establishment of their independence, a policy which the United States has restated continuously for five decades;

Celebrating the rich contributions that immigrants from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made to the multi-ethnic culture of the United States of America, as well as the European heritage enjoyed by the United States as a beneficiary of the contributions of intellectuals, artists, and Hanseatic traders from the Baltic states to the development of Europe; praising the contributions of U.S. citizens to the liberation and rebuilding of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Affirm as a political commitment declared at the highest level, the following principles and procedures to guide their individual and joint efforts to achieve the goals of this Charter.

PRINCIPLES OF PARTNERSHIP

The United States of America has a real, profound and enduring interest in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The United States of America warmly welcomes the success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regaining their freedom and resuming their rightful places in the community of nations.

The United States of America respects the sacrifices and hardships undertaken by the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to re-establish their independence. It encourages efforts by these states to continue to expand their political, economic, security, and social ties with other nations as full members of the transatlantic community.

The Partners affirm their commitment to the rule of law as a foundation for a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations, and to the responsibility of all just societies to protect and respect the human rights and civil liberties of all individuals residing within their territories.

The Partners underscore their shared commitment to the principles and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter.

The Partners reaffirm their shared commitment to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

The Partners will observe in good faith their commitments to promote and respect the standards for human rights embodied in the above-mentioned Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. They will implement their legislation protecting such human rights fully and equitably.

The United States of America commends the measures taken by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to advance the integration of Europe by establishing close cooperative relations among themselves and with their neighbors, as well as their promotion of regional cooperation through their participation in fora such as the Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council of Ministers, and the Council of Baltic Sea States.

Viewing good neighborly relations as fundamental to overall security and stability in the transatlantic community, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirm their determination to further enhance bilateral relations between themselves and with other neighboring states.

The Partners will intensify their efforts to promote the security, prosperity, and stability of the region. The Partners will draw on the points noted below in focusing their efforts to deepen the integration of the Baltic states into transatlantic and European institutions, promote cooperation in security and defense, and develop the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

A COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATION

As part of a common vision of a Europe whole and free, the Partners declare that their shared goal is the full integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into European and transatlantic political, economic, security and defense institutions. Europe will not be fully secure unless Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each are secure.

The Partners reaffirm their commitment to the principle, established in the Helsinki Final Act, repeated in the Budapest and Lisbon OSCE summit declarations, and also contained in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible.

The Partners further share a commitment to the core principle, also articulated in the OSCE Code of Conduct and reiterated in subsequent OSCE summit declarations, that each state has the inherent right to individual and collective self-defense as well as the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.

The Partners support the vital role being played by a number of complementary institutions and bodies—including the OSCE, the European Union (EU), the West European Union (WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Council of Europe (COE), and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)—in achieving the partners' shared goal of an integrated, secure, and undivided Europe.

They believe that, irrespective of factors related to history or geography, such institutions should be open to all European democracies willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities and obligations of membership, as determined by those institutions.

The Partners welcome a strong and vibrant OSCE dedicated to promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. They strongly support the OSCE's

role as a mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and crises.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each reaffirm their goal to become full members of all European and transatlantic institutions, including the European Union and NATO.

The United States of America recalls its longstanding support for the enlargement of the EU, affirming it as a core institution in the new Europe and declaring that a stronger, larger, and outward-looking European Union will further security and prosperity for all of Europe.

The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries in Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership.

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

The United States of America reiterates its view that the enlargement of NATO is an on-going process. It looks forward to future enlargements, and remains convinced that not only will NATO's door remain open to new members, but that the first countries invited to membership will not be the last. No non-NATO country has a veto over Alliance decisions. The United States notes the Alliance is prepared to strengthen its consultations with aspirant countries on the full range of issues related to possible NATO membership.

The Partners welcome the results of the Madrid Summit. They support the Alliance's commitment to an open door policy and welcome the Alliance's recognition of the Baltic states as aspiring members of NATO. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pledge to deepen their close relations with the Alliance through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the intensified dialogue process.

The Partners underscore their interest in Russia's democratic and stable development and support a strengthened NATO-Russia relationship as a core element of their shared vision of a new and peaceful Europe. They welcome the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter, both of which further improve European security.

SECURITY COOPERATION

The Partners will consult together, as well as with other countries, in the event that a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk. The Partners will use bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for such consultations.

The United States welcomes and appreciates the contributions that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already made to European security through the peaceful restoration of independence and their active participation in the Partnership for Peace. The United States also welcomes their contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and other international peacekeeping missions.

Building on the existing cooperation among their respective ministries of defense and armed forces, the United States of America supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to provide for their legitimate defense needs, including development of appropriate and interoperable military forces.

The Partners welcome the establishment of the Baltic Security Assistance Group

(BALTSEA) as an effective body for international coordination of security assistance to Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's defense forces.

The Partners will cooperate further in the development and expansion of defense initiatives such as the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat), the Baltic Squadron (Baltron), and the Baltic airspace management regime (BaltNet), which provide a tangible demonstration of practical cooperation enhancing the common security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the transatlantic community.

The Partners intend to continue mutually beneficial military cooperation and will maintain regular consultations, using the established Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Relations.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The Partners affirm their commitment to free market mechanisms as the best means to meet the material needs of their people.

The United States of America commends the substantial progress its Baltic Partners have made to implement economic reform and development and their transition to free market economies.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emphasize their intention to deepen their economic integration with Europe and the global economy, based on the principles of free movement of people, goods, capital and services.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underscore their commitment to continue market-oriented economic reforms and to express their resolve to achieve full integration into global economic bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) while creating conditions for smoothly acceding to the European Union.

Noting this objective, the United States of America will work to facilitate the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the world economy and appropriate international economic organizations, in particular the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on appropriate commercial terms.

The Partners will work individually and together to develop legal and financial conditions in their countries conducive to international investment. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania welcome U.S. investment in their economies.

The Partners will continue to strive for mutually advantageous economic relations building on the principles of equality and non-discrimination to create the conditions necessary for such cooperation.

The Partners will commerce regular consultations to further cooperation and provide for regular assessment of progress in the areas of economic development, trade, investment, and related fields. These consultations will be chaired at the appropriately high level.

Recognizing that combating international organized crime requires a multilateral effort, the partners agree to cooperate fully in the fight against this threat to the world economy and political stability. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain committed to developing sound legislation in this field and to enhance the implementation of this legislation through the strengthening of a fair and well-functioning judicial system.

THE U.S.-BALTIC RELATIONSHIP

In all of these spheres of common endeavor, the Partners, building on their shared history of friendship and cooperation, solemnly reaffirm their commitment to a rich and dynamic Baltic-American partnership for the 21st century.

The Partners view their partnership in the areas of political, economic, security, defense, cultural, and environmental affairs as

contributing to closer ties between their people and facilitating the full integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into European and transatlantic structures.

In order to further strengthen these ties, the Partners will establish a Partnership Commission chaired at the appropriately high level to evaluate common efforts. This Commission will meet once a year or as needed to take stock of the Partnership, assess results of bilateral consultations on economic, military and other areas, and review progress achieved towards meeting the goals of this Charter.

In order to better reflect changes in the European and transatlantic political and security environment, signing Partners are committed regularly at the highest level to review this agreement.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is signed by the President and the heads of state of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in mid-January, as a commitment to a Europe that is whole and free, based upon Western values and Baltic integration into interlocking European and transatlantic security institutions.

The key language on NATO membership states:

The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance.

We said the same thing to the Russians and to every other country. I might add, by the way, when I say the President made the same commitment for theoretic membership of Russia in the alliance, people say, "Oh, my God, how can you say that?" I would like to take us back 40 years when NATO was contemplating debate on this floor. If someone would have said, "if the admission of Germany would enhance stability, we would invite them," they would have been looked at like they were crazy. Our goal is European stability, territorial integrity. I don't think the President's actions in fact—

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if I might remind my colleague, we are having a colloquy, and he is responding to questions. I appreciate the enthusiasm.

I simply say, Madam President, that the Baltic charter—while it has a lot of verbiage in there, I never said it was a commitment. Let me tell you, Senator, with that, our President slipped the engagement ring on. I don't know how long it will come before that issue is squarely before this Chamber to the effect that now the time has come to admit those nations. If my good friend will look at the map of Europe, as he does, I think, on a daily basis, and see that arch from Poland down through Hungary, the Czech Republic, on down through the next nations to be admitted, Romania and Bulgaria, it's an arch. And just as the Iron Curtain was dropped in the late 1940s by the Soviet Union facing west, that ring of coun-

tries constitutes an iron ring now, encircling much of Russia.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would my distinguished friend yield for a question?

Mr. WARNER. This is a good debate, and I yield to the distinguished senior Senator from New York.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. My friend spoke of this arch dropping from Poland through Romania and Bulgaria.

Mr. WARNER. I have said, Madam President, an iron ring has now replaced the Iron Curtain. It flashed into my mind as I was debating with my distinguished colleague here that while the Iron Curtain faced west, the ring now faces east. I will deal with the Russian planners who have to look at this force that has moved now a border 400 miles east, with the accession of these three nations, closer to Russia. Every military planner has to look at that force and advise the Russian President today, tomorrow, and in the future, as to what the capabilities of that force are, no matter what the intentions may be. I will return to that.

I yield back to my colleague for a question.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I wanted to respond to his wonderful, vivid image of an iron ring surrounding Central Europe and facing Russia. Would my friend not agree—and of course, he will agree because it is a fact of geography—that Russian territory will be within that ring? The simple fact that Poland will be in NATO means that Kaliningrad will border NATO though it is cut off from the rest of Russia. It is cut off, in any event, by Lithuania and Belarus, but I don't have to tell the former Secretary of the Navy that, other than Sebastopol in the Black Sea, the main port of what was the navy of the Soviet Union is in Kaliningrad. We may expand NATO beyond that. Surely that cannot but cause anxiety in Russia.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague. I think obviously history has to be in our rearview window as we look toward what we are about to do here in the Senate. I thank him for that very valuable contribution. I want to now turn to another question.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 60 seconds?

I point out to my friend from New York that the border with Norway has been there for 50 years. And Norway is now providing aid and assistance to Russia. They seem to be getting on very well. It seems not to have caused all that big a problem.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. A tiny border on the Arctic sea.

Mr. BIDEN. A distinction.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Not a Naval base in the Baltic.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my colleague.

Now I proceed to another question to my colleague from Delaware.

Madam President, for some reason we have decided to go ahead. I am not here to argue on the question of timing. But one of the most valuable resources to

this debate is the studies undertaken in the past by the NATO staff, and which are still being undertaken. NATO cannot tell us with certainty what the costs are going to be. They are going to issue another report in the June timeframe, long after this debate will be concluded and this body will have made its decision. But in the current NATO studies—again, they are all classified, so I can't bring them out. But I think without breaching any classification, I ask my good friend: These studies are predicated on a 10-year cost analysis and timeframe, but it is a period of 10 years that NATO is looking at for these three nations and the subject of this accession. It is 10 years before they can bring the level of their military professionalism, the level of their military interoperability—and for those following the debate, I would say that is so we can talk on the same radio and have commonalty among our weapons systems, command and control, and the like—10 years before that level will be brought up to the standards that will be acceptable to our NATO forces.

I say to my good friend: What are his estimates of the cost? What cost estimates is he now putting to this Chamber, to this U.S. Senate, on which we can rely with that degree of certainty as we undertake to commit the United States, in our military budget, to future costs associated with this expansion of three nations?

And, as a subset to my question, will he comment on France's statement to the effect that they will not bear any added costs associated with this expansion. Do I and do others interpret that as saying that we are paying—the United States of America today—26 percent of all the costs of NATO, and that that will be a further added cost to the American taxpayer occasioned by the sustaining of France and meeting whatever level of cost the Senator is about to exchange with us for the NATO expansion?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will attempt to respond. Please, I ask both my colleagues. I have a very good friend whose interest is more practical in academics, and every once in a while I will say, "Bob, do you understand what I am saying?" And he will look at me, and say, "JOE, I not only understand, I overstand." If I get into the "overstand" category, please let me know if I am overresponding to what you wish me to respond to.

But let me answer the French issue first. It is always difficult, as my friend knows, understanding what the French mean. But the short answer to his question is that France has changed its view. France has publicly now said that in fact it will now meet its share of the expansion cost.

Second, on the first question asked about target goals, I remind my friend of a little bit of history; that is, that it is important to note that Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain were admitted to NATO without any target force

goal, and that no ally meets—including us—100 percent of the target force goal now, No. 1.

No. 2, to the extent that the three new applicants are committing to and fulfilling their targets in advance of accession is another demonstration that their commitment to the alliance and their capability to fulfill those target goals are, in fact, real. Poland has stated that it will fulfill all the target force goals that are due prior to accession. The Poles address the capabilities of NATO military authorities to determine what NATO military authorities have determined are necessary for new members. Of the additional target force goals over the planning period of 1999 to 2003, only a portion of them have target dates that are applicable prior to accession. Poland has also stated that it will complete all the remaining target goals; the other nations as well. And when you talk about the target goals, the Senator makes it sound as though it will be 10 years before anything is done, 10 years before all of these things are met. Many of them will be met within the next 6 months; some will take as long as 10 years.

With regard to what number I am using in terms of the cost of enlargement, I am using the figure \$40 million a year for the next 10 years. If you want me to elaborate on that, I will be happy to explain what I mean by how I arrive at that and why I think the figure that has been put forward by NATO is an accurate figure. But I do not want to take the time of my colleagues, if they wish to respond.

So I say to my friend, the figure that I am using is the figure of \$40 million a year based upon a U.S. commitment of \$400 million over 10 years. That reflects roughly a 25 percent burden sharing on our part for the costs of enlargement, the total cost being, over 10 years, roughly \$1.5 billion. That is how I arrive at our cost. I will be happy, as I said, to go into detail on that if my friends would like me to.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I am sure there will be further debate. But I also point out that the Congressional Budget Office came up with a figure of \$125 billion. The Senator is familiar with that. Of course, we recognize that embraces some other aspects of the cost, but, nevertheless, I think in fairness to all parties, we are handing out blank checks. That is in the words of my able colleague, Senator SMITH, who used that phrase first as we began to proceed on this thing.

Mr. BIDEN. Let the Record reflect that I will not engage the Senator now, but I totally disagree with that argument and that statement that we are signing a "blank check." It is nowhere near a blank check. But I will be happy, again, to engage at the appropriate time.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that two articles in today's Washington Post—one entitled "NATO Hopefuls Lag in Meet-

ing Requirements" and the other entitled "Deciding NATO's Future Without Debate"—be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1998]

DECIDING NATO'S FUTURE WITHOUT DEBATE

(By David S. Broder)

This week the United States Senate, which counts among its major accomplishments this year renaming Washington National Airport for former president Ronald Reagan and officially labeling Saddam Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter of enlarging the 20th century's most successful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice up the pork in the \$214 billion highway and mass transit bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, "No one is interested in this home," so few of his colleagues think it worth much of their time.

It is a cliché to observe that since the Cold War ended, foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voter's concerns. But, as two of the veteran senators who question the wisdom of NATO's expansion—Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York and Republican John Warner of Virginia—remarked in separate interviews, serious consideration of treaties and military alliances once was considered what the Senate was for.

No longer. President Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, has pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott to get the NATO deal done before Clinton leaves Sunday on a trip to Africa. When Warner and others said the matter should be delayed until the Senate has time for a full-scale debate, Lott refused. He pointed out that a Senate delegation had joined Clinton at NATO summits in Paris and Madrid last year (no sacrifice being too great for our solons) and that there had been extensive committee hearings.

Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators, notwithstanding the acknowledgment by advocates that the Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for ratification has approached, successive estimates of the costs to NATO have been shrinking magically, but the latest NATO estimate of \$1.5 billion over the next decade is barely credible.

The administration, in the person of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has steadfastly refused to say what happens next if NATO starts moving eastward toward the border of Russia. "The door is open" to other countries with democratic governments and free markets, Albright says. The administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.

Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are brought in, the United States and other signatories will have a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the westernmost border of Russia. He points to a Russian government strategy paper published

last December saving the expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons.

Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in 1993 and approved by the Senate two years ago.

George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago devised the fundamental strategy for "containment" of the Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic policy blunder. Former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading military authority, told me, "Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and this [NATO expansion] makes them more suspicious and less cooperative . . . The administration's answers to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes."

Former senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, for 30 years probably the wisest "dove" in that body, agrees, as do former ambassadors to Moscow and other Americans with close contacts in Russia.

To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all, it has taken place outside the hearing of the American people. Too had our busy Senate can't find time before it votes to let the public in on the argument.

[From the Washington Post]

NATO HOPEFULS LAG IN MEETING REQUIREMENTS

(By Christine Spolar)

WARSAW, March 17.—As the U.S. Senate moves toward approving NATO expansion, the alliance's three prospective new members are quietly being told to step up basic revisions to their military forces such as English-language training of senior officers.

Diplomats and defense experts from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic acknowledge that since they were invited to join NATO last July their countries have fallen behind in key areas designed to ensure military compatibility with the West.

Training in English, NATO's standard operating language, is lagging in all three countries. Nearly nine years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, none of the three armies has more than a few hundred officers who have achieved a level of fluency in English acceptable to NATO.

In addition, interviews with politicians, analysts and military officers indicate each country is having trouble meeting or maintaining promised changes such as providing for adequate civilian control of their militaries, installing safeguards to protect NATO secrets and modernizing their air defense systems.

While the problems are not expected to derail NATO's plans to welcome the three former Soviet Bloc countries as new members next year, they have raised concerns about their ability to meet their commitments to the Western alliance.

"I know many of our politicians are lying to themselves and saying, 'They tell us we have to do these things but we probably have more time,'" said Jiri Payne, a member of the Czech Parliament and, until last year, a deputy defense minister. "My feeling is that people here still don't understand how much we need to change our system."

Poland, the largest NATO aspirant, has been vexed by a dearth of civilians who want

to work at the Defense Ministry. The Czech Republic has yet to enact legislation to protect classified information and to define military pay ranks. Hungary has delayed required purchases of radar air defense systems in part because of bureaucratic inertia and in part to see whether NATO would pick up most of the tab.

"Militarily, we're not so behind," said Imre Mecs, head of the Hungarian parliament's defense committee. "What we're lagging behind in is language and mentality. The qualitative changes require a lot more work, a lot more money and a lot more energy. And you don't see the changes quickly."

Language training is a significant barometer to gauge how the three countries are doing as they prepare for NATO accession.

In assessing applications for membership last year, NATO settled on largely political criteria. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited primarily because of the progress they had made in creating stable democracies and instituting market reforms.

None was expected to achieve overnight a level of force modernization on par with NATO standards. But they were asked to ensure that their armies were able to communicate with those of the alliance's 16 other members.

Over the past couple of years, each country received hundreds of thousands of dollars in U.S. aid for language labs, and support from Canada and Britain for classes or instruction.

Last fall, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin Kramer underscored the need for English training in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations' Committee. "English language proficiency is a critical element of NATO inter-operability," he said, adding that Poland, the largest NATO aspirant, with 230,000 troops, expected to have 25 percent of its officers proficient in English by 1999.

Results so far suggest Poland will have difficulty meeting that target. It has about 60 officers who are considered fluent by NATO standards; it needs about 400 within the year, according to Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek.

Military officials in Hungary and the Czech Republic claim as many as 300 officers are fluent in English. Interviews with military instructors familiar with the training, however, indicate the total is about one-third to one-half that many. Hungary has yet to even implement NATO English-language testing standards.

Officials from all three countries claimed last year that between 1,200 and 1,500 of their soldiers speak English. Some officials said they revised their numbers downward after examining NATO standards.

Since the fall of communism, Poland has been cited as the best argument for NATO's eastward expansion because of its size and strategic location in the heart of Europe. Eighty percent of Poles supported joining the alliance. But within the military itself, the idea was a tougher sell.

Before a trip to Washington last month, Geremek said top NATO officials had been frank about Poland's need to improve officer language training and to appoint more civilians to key positions in the Defense Ministry.

"Civilian control means we should have civilians in this department," said one official in the Defense Ministry who asked not to be identified. "And we have a handful. With what we have, it's difficult to change attitudes and mentality."

Lt. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, chief of Hungary's armed forces, said no former Warsaw Pact army finds the change easy. "It's clear what's supposed to be done," he said. "But of

course we don't have enough civilians to fill the jobs."

One Hungarian Defense Ministry official said that over the past six months he had offered jobs to at least 20 people. They all said no. They could earn four to five times more in the private sector, he said.

Mr. WARNER. I see our distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from New York, who has a corporate memory of affairs beyond this border of our great country, who is in the mold of that great Senator Vandenberg who said that "all politics stops at the water's edge"—am I not correct on that?—I am sure he can extol on that virtue, and I have subscribed to that theory.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if the Senator will yield for a request, I ask unanimous consent that Mark Tauber, a State Department Pearson Fellow on my staff, be accorded floor privileges for the duration of the consideration of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Treaty Document 105-36.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I would like to first thank my friend from Virginia. We have reached across the aisle to collaborate on two amendments which we will offer at the appropriate time. Today we are engaged in just some preliminary observations.

I will begin with the current event of one of the more interesting aspects of life in Moscow at this moment, which is that it is in so many ways much more open than the United States. Their archives are open, and their national security plans are open. I do not doubt there are closed elements as well. But on December 17, the Russian Federation issued Presidential edict, No. 1300, entitled "The Russian National Security Blueprint."

This is the kind of document that we would not have gotten from Moscow in the past. We can think of the famous NSC-68, which was drafted early in 1950 and was so powerfully influential in our affairs for many years. NSC-68 remained secret for 30 years. By contrast, the Presidential edict, No. 1300, was published in Moscow's official gazette on December 26, 9 days after it was issued. It is a disturbing document; yet, in many ways it is an admirable one in the clarity with which it sets forth the exceptional difficulties facing the Russian Federation at this point. It speaks in its first paragraph that:

The Russian Federation National Security Blueprint is a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding the goals and state strategy in the sphere of assuring the security of the individual and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, manmade, ecological, informational, or other nature in the light of existing resources and potential.

It speaks of internal threats in the context of the convulsions that have

occurred in that country within the past decade. The forces which played such a fundamental role in breaking up the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is a sober assessment of the threats to Russian security.

Madam President, in this debate it should be recorded that the national security document, the guiding principles of the Russian Federation, states right up front:

The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security.

That was drafted, or agreed to, on December 17 and published December 26. It is a formidable document and an extraordinarily candid one. It speaks to the ethnic problems, it speaks to the economic decline, it speaks to poverty, it speaks to unemployment, and it speaks to the nature of the Russian defense forces.

They acknowledge that large portions of their borders are undefended. They acknowledge that their traditional conventional weapons systems are deteriorated, if not in fact dysfunctional. And they say—and this is the most difficult part—that they do have nuclear weapons and, if necessary, they will use them.

This is not the type of posture that we had hoped for, after the long arms control efforts from President Eisenhower's time to START II. I was one of the Senate observers to the START II talks and the present Russian Ambassador to the United States, who wrote a very important article recently in the Washington Post, was one of the negotiators then. With START, for the first time we agreed to build our nuclear forces down. Previous agreements had really legitimated the respective nations' plans to increase their nuclear forces. We reached that historic moment, and have been able to build on that important achievement. Since then, other historic treaties have also been achieved, allowing eminent Senators, such as the Senator from Delaware, to bring to this floor the Chemical Weapons Agreement, a very powerful, far-sighted document.

But now the Russian government says, under the circumstances, we have nothing left but nuclear weapons. We are in serious difficulty. The prospect of NATO expansion to the east is unacceptable. The term is "unacceptable." It is not a calculating document.

May I make this point twofold? I would like to go back just a bit. There is not one of us in this body who has not paid some heed to the affairs of the Soviet Union over time and the world of communism over time. Yet rather early on it began to occur to some of us that all was not well in that arrangement and that it was not going to remain permanent as was often presumed.

Just a short while ago, Arkady Shevchenko documented—and his obituary appeared in the principal national papers. Arkady Shevchenko was the second ranking official at the United

Nations during the time when I had the honor to be our Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Shevchenko was a protégé of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. He was on anyone's short list to succeed Gromyko. He held one essentially attractive position after another. There he was, the Under Secretary General responsible for the Security Council, about as important a position as you will get in any diplomatic service and particularly in that of the Soviet Union.

Whilst I was at that post in New York, Shevchenko defected to the United States. It was a very closely held matter. He simply passed a note in a book in the General Assembly library, that he was thinking of defecting. He was a man at the top of his form. In the manner of the espionage craft, we established that he had defected and then left him in place for some two and one half years, where he remained in his position as Under Secretary General whilst providing us information.

In Moscow they began to sense something was the matter and they began to think a defector was in place. It even got to the point where the Soviet Ambassador here in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, another person of great stature in the Soviet system, came under suspicion as the source of the security leaks. Finally, they worked it out. That is not too hard. You give three messages to three different people and you see which one the United States gets. Shevchenko had to defect. He later moved to Washington, where I got to know him. I had known him somewhat at the United Nations, but I got to know him better here.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the obituary for Arkady N. Shevchenko be printed in the RECORD, which is a way of saying goodbye to someone who chose democracy.

There being no objection, the obituary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, March 11, 1998]

ARKADY N. SHEVCHENKO, 67, A KEY SOVIET DEFECTOR, DIES
(By David Stout)

WASHINGTON, March 10—Arkady N. Shevchenko, who stunned the world two decades ago when he became the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to defect to the United States, died on Feb. 28 in obscurity in his suburban home in Bethesda, Md. He was 67.

Mr. Shevchenko's death was announced in a brief statement by his church, St. John the Baptist Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Washington. By the time the world began to learn of his death today, he had been buried for three days.

Mr. Shevchenko's body was discovered in his home by a daughter, who had gone to check on her father when she could not reach him by telephone, the Montgomery County police said, adding that there was no sign of foul play.

The manner of his death could not have been in more stark contrast to the fanfare that greeted his defection to the United States in April 1978. His decision to stay in the United States and spurn his own country

caused a major diplomatic dust-up: the Administration of President Carter was at that time engaged in sensitive disarmament talks with the Soviet Union and, as one American official put it at the time, "This is the last thing we need right now."

Mr. Shevchenko was Under Secretary General of the United Nations at that time, and apparently on course to have a brilliant career in the Government of the Soviet Union. He was a protégé of the stone-faced Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, and some diplomatic observers thought he had a shot at one day succeeding his mentor.

As events would reveal, he was also a figure of contradictions, a man who wore different faces for different occasions and different people.

One West European diplomat at the United Nations called him "a faceless functionary" whose habit of poking harmless fun at Soviet officialdom did not detract from the fact that he was a hard-line, doctrinaire Communist with a built-in suspicion of all things Western.

Only a handful of people at the Central Intelligence Agency knew that Mr. Shevchenko had been providing information to the American Government for some two and a half years before his defection.

One C.I.A. official who did know was F. Mark Wyatt, who held various high posts in the C.I.A. before his retirement. His specialty was shepherding Soviet agents who wanted to help the United States.

"Arkady was a friend of mine," Mr. Wyatt said tonight. "I am grieved."

Mr. Wyatt and other C.I.A. officials agree that, while Mr. Shevchenko did not provide sensational details of secret weapons or war plans, he furnished valuable insights into the thinking of people at the highest level of the Soviet Government, many of whom he knew personally.

There really were people in the Kremlin who thought that the United States was controlled by a cabal of Wall Street capitalists in league with oafish Pentagon types with stars on their shoulders, he told his debriefers—first at a secret C.I.A. "safe house" on East 64th Street in Manhattan and, after his defection became public, in more relaxed settings in New York City and Washington.

Mr. Wyatt said he came to respect Mr. Shevchenko greatly, convinced that his decision to turn his back on his country was not based on greed but simply on his conviction, as an educated Soviet citizen, that the United States was a better place to live with a better system of government.

On the eve of his defection, Mr. Shevchenko told his aides he had to go back to the Soviet Union to visit his gravely ill mother-in-law. Instead, he had told a few Americans of his decision to abandon his country and his career. As Under Secretary General, he was second only to Kurt Waldheim at the United Nations.

"God, we got a big fish!" Mr. Wyatt recalls one C.I.A. colleague exclaiming at the time. Indeed, Mr. Shevchenko was considered the C.I.A.'s top trophy of the 1970's. An irony in the case was that one C.I.A. agent who debriefed him was Aldrich Ames, who would later betray the United States by selling secrets to the Soviets.

His first wife, Leongina, eventually committed suicide after returning to the Soviet Union. He later married an American, but she soon died of cancer, Mr. Wyatt said. Mr. Shevchenko is survived by his third wife, Natasha, a son and daughter and a stepdaughter.

In his first life, Arkady Nikolayevich Shevchenko, a native of Ukraine, studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, earning a doctorate in 1954, two years before joining the Foreign Ministry.

His second life was more erratic. In 1978, a Washington call girl charged publicly that she had been paid by the C.I.A. to provide sex for him. The publicity was shattering to him, Mr. Wyatt recalled tonight.

But his book "Breaking With Moscow" (Knopf, 1985) brought him fame and prosperity, and earned money on the lecture circuit and as a consultant to research organizations.

Mr. Shevchenko complained at first that some of his C.I.A. handlers were insensitive to the trauma of defection. But he made peace with his new country and became an American citizen. "I was at the ceremony," Mr. Wyatt said. "He was very happy."

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, if I could say to my friend from Delaware, that is when I became convinced the Soviet Union would not last through the 20th century. When a person of Arkady N. Shevchenko stature defects, it means the system is not working. And it did not work. But when it came apart, there is a proposition in which Owen Harries, in a very fine article in *The National Interest*, cites British historian Martin Wight who observed that "Great Power status is lost, as it is won, by violence. A Great Power does not die in its bed."

Of all the extraordinary events of the 20th century, nothing is more important, more striking than the fact that the Soviet Union and that whole world empire died in bed. There was virtually no bloodshed. The only bloodshed that really took place occurred within the remaining Russian Federation, with its many different languages and regions, when you began to get things like Chechnya and the appearance of a Russian army that clearly was not capable of fairly elementary military operations.

I say that is a beleaguered and troubled society. And one that could have resisted, in the first instance, the Polish defection. They could have resisted others. They had an army; they had an air force; they had nuclear strategic and tactical weapons. They did not, Owen Harries argued—a man, I must say, of impeccable conservative credentials—that there was an implicit understanding that we would not take advantage of what the Soviet Union was allowing to happen to their empire. They gave up everything they had hoped for from 1917. They collapsed. And they recognized their failure.

Again, we had been picking up things like that in the mid-1970s. Murray Feshbach, a distinguished demographer here at the Bureau of the Census, noted that life expectancy for Soviet males was declining. It wasn't working. It was all a lie.

If I could relate one more event as a bit of an anecdote but not without some interest. Our distinguished Ambassador at the time has related it as well. In 1987, I was in Moscow on a mission of possible importance. It had to do with the infiltration of our new Embassy with listening devices and things like that. We were treated with great courtesy. We were presented a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier. We visited Lenin's tomb. We were shown

Lenin's apartment. I was struck; behind Lenin's desk there were four bookshelves, two shelves of English books and two of French. Now, I expect they were put there for the delectation of George Bernard Shaw and Lady Astor in the 1930s, but still there they were. And I recognized that I had met three of those authors. I can not say I was intimate with them, but I had met them.

Two days later we called on Boris Yeltsin, who was then a candidate member of the politburo. This was August, and he had the duty to stay in town in August while the rest were off in the Crimean. To be friendly, I said, well, we were in Lenin's apartment looking over his books and I knew three of those people. Isn't that interesting? And it was very clear, as the U.N. Ambassador said, that Yeltsin had never heard of any of these authors and could care less; he hadn't read a book since he had left technical school. There was not a person left in the politburo who believed any of that.

I say to my friend from Delaware, Yeltsin said to me, "I know who you are. I know where you are from. And what I want to know is how am I supposed to run Moscow with 1929 rent controls?" This was the level of ideological discourse.

It was a sick society, wounded. It collapsed, died. And what is left is fragile, and they have just formally proclaimed both their vulnerability and their determination that if NATO is expanded, the no-first-use principle, which saved mankind in the 20th century, is over because all they have to defend themselves are nuclear weapons. It is a curiously ironic outcome that at the end of the cold war we might face a nuclear Armageddon.

I leave it there. I have nothing more to add at this moment.

But I ask, Madam President, if I might have excerpts printed from the Russian National Security Blueprint in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPTS FROM RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY BLUEPRINT

(Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta in Russian 26 Dec 97)

["Russian Federation National Security Blueprint" approved by Russian Federation presidential edict No. 1300 dated 17 December 1997]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation National Security Blueprint (hereinafter the Blueprint) is a political document reflecting the aggregate of officially accepted views regarding goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made [tekhnogenyy], ecological, informational, or other nature in the light of existing resources and potential.

The Blueprint formulates key directions and principles of state policy. The Blueprint is the basis for the elaboration of specific programs and organizational documents in the sphere of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.

I. RUSSIA WITHIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY

At present the situation in the international arena is characterized primarily by the strengthening of trends toward the formation of a multipolar world. This is manifested in the strengthening of the economic and political positions of a considerable number of states and their integration-oriented associations and in the improvement of mechanisms for multilateral control of international political, economic, financial, and informational processes. While military force factors retain their significance in international relations, economic, political, scientific and technical, ecological, and informational factors are playing an increasing role. At the same time international competition to secure natural, technological, and informational resources and markets is intensifying.

The formation of a multipolar world will be a lengthy process. Relapses into attempts to create a structure of international relations based on one-sided solutions of the key problems of world politics, including solutions based on military force, are still strong at the present stage of this process.

The growing gap between developed and developing countries will also affect the pace of and directions in the formation of a new structure of international relations.

The present period in the development of international relations opens up for the Russian Federation new opportunities to ensure its security, but entails a number of threats connected with the change in Russia's status within the world and the difficulties in carrying out internal reforms.

The preconditions for demilitarizing international relations and strengthening the role of law in settling disputed interstate problems have been created and the danger of direct aggression against the Russian Federation has decreased. All this opens up fundamentally new opportunities to mobilize resources to solve the country's internal problems.

There are prospects of broader integration of the Russian Federation with the world economy, including international credit and financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A trend toward increased cooperation between Russia and a number of CIS member states has emerged.

There has been an expansion in the commonality of Russia's interests with many states on problems of international security such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settling and preventing regional conflicts, countering international terrorism and the drugs business, and solving acute global ecological problems, including nuclear and radiation security. This significantly increases the opportunity to ensure Russia's national security by non-military means—by means of legal treaty, political, economic, and other measures.

At the same time Russia's influence on resolving cardinal questions of international life which affect our state's interests has decreased significantly. In these conditions the desire of a number of states to weaken Russia's positions in the political, economic, and military spheres has increased.

The process of creating a model of general and all-embracing security for Europe on the basis of principles advanced in many respects on Russia's initiative entails considerable difficulties. The prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security. Multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at both the global (United Nations) and regional (OSCE,

CIS) levels are still insufficiently effective, which limits our potential when using such mechanisms to ensure Russia's national security interests by political and legal means. Russia is in a certain degree of isolation from the integration processes under way in the Asian and Pacific region. All this is unacceptable to it as an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian and Pacific region.

The positive trends in the internal development of the state and society are still not stable enough. The main reason for this is the preservation of crisis phenomena in the Russian economy. Production has declined and its structure has deteriorated in comparison with the pre-reform period. Investment and innovation activity is declining. Russia is lagging increasingly far behind developed countries in terms of science and technology. Dependence on imports of food, consumer goods, equipment, and technologies is increasing. The external and internal state debt is growing. There is an exodus of skilled personnel from the sphere of material production and from the scientific sphere. The number of man-made emergencies is increasing. The property stratification of society is increasing, and the living standards of much of the population are declining. The level of crime and corruption is still high.

The country's economic, scientific, and demographic potential is declining. The markets and raw material infrastructure of Russian industry have shrunk. Despite the unprecedented increase in the share of GNP accounted for by foreign trade, Russia's integration with the world market often takes place on terms that are not to our country's advantage.

Social accord has not been achieved, and the process of establishing a unifying national idea that defines not only the philosophical basis but also the long-term goals of the development of multinational Russian society and the main ways and means of achieving them has not been completed.

The former defense system has been disrupted, and the creation of a new one is proceeding slowly. Long unprotected sections of the Russian Federation state border have appeared.

At the same time Russia has all the preconditions for maintaining and consolidating its position as a power capable of ensuring its people's prosperity and playing an important role in world processes. Russia possesses a considerable economic and scientific and technical potential which determines the country's capacity for stable development. It occupies a unique strategic position on the Eurasian continent and possesses considerable reserves of raw materials and resources. The main institutions of democratic statehood and a mixed economy have been established in the country. Measures are being taken to stabilize the economy and create the preconditions for production growth on the basis of the structural restructuring of industry. Russia is one of the biggest multinational states and has an age-old history and culture and its own national interests and traditions.

All these factors, bearing in mind that the Russian Federation has a powerful nuclear force potential, create the preconditions for ensuring reliable national security for the country in the 21st century.

II. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

* * * * *

The Russian Federation's national interests in the international sphere require the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia's positions as a great power—one of the influential

centers of the developing multipolar world. The main components of this course are: the formation on a voluntary basis of an integration-oriented association of CIS member states; the development of equal partnership with the other great powers—the centers of economic and military might; the development of international cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism; the strengthening of those mechanisms of collective management of world political and economic processes in which Russia plays an important role, and first and foremost the strengthening of the UN Security Council.

An undoubted priority in Russia's foreign policy course is and will remain activities to ensure the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of the state and to protect its constitutional system against possible encroachments by other states.

The realization of Russia's national interests in the international sphere is largely determined by the nature of relations with the leading powers and integration-oriented associations of the world community. The development of equal partnership relations with them accords with the Russian Federation's status and its foreign policy interests and is intended to strengthen global and regional security and create favorable conditions for our country's participation in world trade and in cooperation in the scientific-technical and credit and financial spheres.

* * * * *

III. THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A geopolitical and international situation that is new to Russia, negative processes in the country's economy, the deterioration in interethnic relations, and the social polarization of Russian society create a direct threat to the country's national security.

The critical state of the economy is the main cause of the emergence of a threat to the Russian Federation's national security. This is manifested in the substantial reduction in production, the decline in investment and innovation, the destruction of scientific and technical potential, the stagnation of the agrarian sector, the disarray of the monetary and payments system, the reduction in the income side of the federal budget, and the growth of the state debt. An undoubted threat is posed by the increase in the share of the fuel and raw materials sector and the formation of an economic model based on the exportation of fuel and raw materials and the importation of equipment, food, and consumer goods, which could lead to the conquest of Russia's internal market by foreign firms.

These threatening phenomena are characterized by an increase in the exportation from Russia of foreign currency reserves and strategically important raw materials along with extremely inefficient or criminal utilization of the profits, an increase in the exodus of skilled personnel and intellectual property from Russia, uncontrolled outflow of capital, growth in the country's dependence on foreign producers of high-tech equipment, underdeveloped financial, organizational, and information support for Russian exports, and an irrational structure of imports.

The decline in the country's scientific and technical potential leads to Russia's loss of its leading positions in the world, a fall in the quality of research in strategically important areas of scientific-technical progress, the decay of high-tech production facilities, a decline in the technical standard of physical production, an increase in the probability of man-made disasters, Russia's becoming technologically dependent on the leading Western countries, and the undermining of the state's defense potential, and

makes it hard to achieve a radical modernization of the national technological base.

A particular threat is created by the low level of large-scale investment in the Russian economy. The economic revival of Russia is impossible without major capital investments in the strategic spheres of the economy.

A threat to Russia's security in the social sphere, in consequence of the critical condition of the economy, is posed by the increase in the proportion of the population living below the poverty line, the stratification of society into a small group of rich citizens and the vast bulk of poorly-off citizens, and the escalation of social tension.

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The negative processes in the economy exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies of Russian Federation components and lead to the growth of the threat of violation of the country's territorial integrity and the unity of its legal area.

The ethnic egotism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinism that are displayed in the activities of a number of ethnic social formations help to increase national separatism and create favorable conditions for the emergence of conflicts in this sphere. Apart from increasing political instability, this leads to the weakening of Russia's single economic area and its most important components—manufacturing, technological, and transportation links, and the financial, banking, credit, and tax systems.

The factors intensifying the threat of the growth of nationalism and national and regional separatism include mass migration and the uncontrolled reproduction of human resources in a number of regions of the country. The main reasons for this are the consequences of the USSR's breakup into national-territorial formations, the failures of nationalities policy and economic policy both in Russia and in the CIS states, and the spread and escalation of conflict situations based on national and ethnic grounds.

Other factors are the deliberate and purposeful interference by foreign states and international organizations in the internal life of Russia's peoples, and the weakening of the role of Russian as the state language of the Russian Federation.

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The threat to the nation's physical health is perturbing. Its sources lie in virtually all spheres of the state's life and activity and are manifested most graphically in the critical state of the systems for health care and the population's social protection and in the rapid rise in the consumption of alcohol and narcotics.

The consequences of this profound systemic crisis are the drastic reduction in the birth rate and average life expectancy, the deterioration in people's health, the distortion of the demographic and social composition of society, the undermining of manpower resources as the basis for the development of production, and the weakening of the fundamental cell of society—the family.

This development of demographic processes is causing a reduction in society's spiritual, moral, and creative potential.

Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the international sphere are manifested via the attempts of other states to counter Russia's consolidation as an influential center of the multipolar world that is taking shape. This is reflected in actions aimed at destroying the Russian Federation's territorial integrity, including actions involving the use of interethnic, religious, and other internal contradictions, and also in territorial claims involving allusions in individual cases to the lack of the precise

registration of state borders in treaties. By their policy these states are seeking to reduce the Russian Federation's importance in the solution of key problems of the world community and in the activity of international organizations. As a whole this could lead to the limitation of Russia's influence, the infringement of its most important national interests, and the weakening of its positions in Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia.

The threat of the emergence or aggravation in the CIS states of political, ethnic, and economic crises capable of delaying or destroying the integration process is acquiring special importance for our state. These countries' establishment as friendly, independent, stable, and democratic countries is extremely important to the Russian Federation.

Despite the positive changes in the world, threats to the Russian Federation's national security remain in the defense sphere. Considering the profound changes in the nature of the Russian Federation's relations with other leading powers, it can be concluded that the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia is virtually absent in the foreseeable future. At the same time we cannot rule out attempts at power rivalry with Russia. The most real threat to Russia in the defense sphere is posed by existing and potential hotbeds of local wars and armed conflicts close to its state border.

The proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and the technologies for their production and means of delivery poses a serious threat, primarily in countries adjacent to Russia or regions close to it.

At the same time the spectrum of threats connected with international terrorism, including with the possible use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, is expanding.

The conservation or creation by major powers (and their coalitions) of powerful groups of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russia's territory remains a threat to Russia's national security in the defense sphere. Even when there are no aggressive intentions with regard to Russia, these groupings present a potential military danger.

NATO's expansion to the East and its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe create the threat of a new split in the continent which would be extremely dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings of troops and nuclear weapons and also the inadequate effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms for maintaining peace.

The technological upsurge of a number of leading world powers and the buildup of their potential for creating new-generation arms and military equipment could lead to a qualitatively new stage in the development of the arms race.

Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the defense sphere also lie in the incomplete nature of the process of the reform of the state's military organization, the continuing gulf between political aims and their implementation in military and military-technical policy, inadequate financing for national defense the lack of elaboration of modern approaches toward military organizational development, and the imperfection of its normative legal base.

At the present state this is manifested in the extremely acute nature of social problems in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops and military formations and organs, the critically low level of operational and combat training of the troops (forces) and staffs, the intolerable decline in the level of provision of the troops (forces) with modern and promising types of

weapons and military equipment and in general in the reduction of the state's potential for safeguarding the Russian Federation's security.

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IV. SAFEGUARDING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S
NATIONAL SECURITY

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The main aim of safeguarding the Russian Federation's national security is the creation and maintenance of an economic, political, international, and military-strategic position for the country which creates favorable conditions for the development of the individual, society, and state and rules out the danger of the weakening of the Russian Federation's role and importance as a subject of international law and the undermining of the state's ability to implement its national interests in the international arena.

The most important tasks for safeguarding the Russian Federation's national security are: the boosting of the country's economy and the pursuit of an independent and socially oriented economic course; the improvement of Russian Federation legislation, the consolidation of law and order and the sociopolitical stability of society, Russian statehood, federalism, and local self-management; the formation of harmonious interethnic relations; the safeguarding of Russia's international security through the establishment of equal partnership with the world's leading states; the consolidation of the state's security in the defense and information spheres; the safeguarding of the population's vital activity in a technogenically safe and environmentally clean world.

The basic principles for safeguarding the Russian Federation's national security are: the observance of the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation while implementing activity to safeguard national security; the unity, interconnection, and balance of all types of security and the alteration of their priority depending on the situation; the priority of political, economic, and information measures to safeguard national security; the feasibility (considering available resources, forces, and facilities) of the proposed tasks; the observance of norms of international law and Russian laws when implementing measures of an enforced nature (including those involving the use of military forces); the combination of centralized management of forces and facilities for safeguarding security with the transfer of some of the powers in this field, in accordance with Russia's federative structure, to the organs of state power of the Russian Federation components and the organs of local self-management.

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The implementation of the idea of national and social accord will enable our country to enter the new age as a power which has achieved economic and spiritual progress and enjoys a high growth potential based on democratic principles of state structure, internal harmony of social relations, and responsibility for the maintenance of global stability and stable development of panhuman civilization.

The strengthening of Russian statehood and the improvement and development of federalism and local self-government are most important tasks whose solution will lead to the ensuring of the Russian Federation's national security. The main objective in this sphere is to elaborate and implement a comprehensive approach toward the solution of legal, economic, social, and ethnopolitical problems while ensuring that the interests of the Russian Federation and its components are observed.

The implementation of the constitutional principle of people's power, under which the

multiethnic people exercise their power both directly and through organs of state power and organs of local self-government, requires the ensuring of coordinated functioning and collaboration by all organs of state power, a rigid vertical structure of executive power, and unity of Russia's judicial system. This is ensured through the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the introduction of a more clear-cut functional distribution of powers among state institutions, and the strengthening of Russia's federal structure by improving its treaty relations with Russian Federation components within the framework of their constitutional status.

The strengthening of Russian statehood presupposes the enhancement of the state's role in the basic spheres of social life, the improvement of Russian Federation legislation as the universal basis of state activity in the conditions of building a rule-of-law state, the ensuring of the supremacy of the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws over other legal acts, the formation and development of organizational and legal mechanisms to prevent breaches of the laws, and the adoption and execution of state decisions in crisis situations.

The building of a rule-of-law depends largely on the correct definition and clarification of the extent of the responsibilities and powers of organs of state power, the specific categories and status of promulgated normative legal acts, the procedure for their amendment or repeal, the improvement of the mechanism and procedures for mutual relations between state and society, and the procedure for taking into account the interests of Russian Federation components.

The protection of Russian federalism includes purposeful activity to block any encroachments on the country's state integrity, the system of organs of state power, and the unity of Russia's legal area.

The main objective of the protection of Russian federalism is to prevent the transformation of federal relations into confederal ones.

The main avenues for the protection of Russian federalism are: ensuring the supremacy of federal legislation and, on this basis, improving the legislation of Russian Federation components; elaborating organizational and legal mechanisms to protect the state integrity, the unity of the legal area, and the national interests of Russia; developing and implementing a regional policy which ensures the best possible way of taking federal and regional interests into account; improving the mechanism for preventing the emergence of political parties and public associations pursuing separatist and anticonstitutional objectives and for blocking their activity; pursuing a considered and balanced nationalities policy.

The efforts of society and the state in the struggle against crime must be aimed at creating an effective counteraction system to ensure reliable protection of the interests of the individual, society, and the state.

The following tasks are paramount: to enhance the state's role as guarantor of national security and to create the legal basis necessary for this purpose and the mechanism for its application; to strengthen the system of law enforcement organs; to involve state organs, within the limits of their powers, in activity to prevent illegal actions.

Glasnost is the most important condition for a successful struggle against all manifestations of crime. Society is entitled to know about the decisions and measures adopted by organs of state power in this sphere. They must be open, specific, and comprehensible to all citizens, they must be preventive, they must ensure the equality of all before the law and the inevitability of

punishment, and they must rely on society's support.

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A most important role in the preservation of traditional spiritual values is played by the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church and the churches of other confessions. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the destructive role played by sundry religious sects which inflict considerable damage on Russian society's spiritual life and pose a direct threat to the life and health of Russia's citizens, and are often used as cover for illegal activities.

Society's spiritual rebirth is impossible without enhancing the role of the Russian language. Its proclamation as state language and the language of international contacts between the peoples of Russia and of CIS member states is a most important factor for unifying the people of multiethnic Russia.

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Russia will firmly and consistently honor its commitments in the sphere of reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments, will implement measures to strengthen confidence and stability and to ensure international monitoring of deliveries of military technologies and dual-purpose technologies, and will assist in the creation of zones free from weapons of mass destruction.

The Russian Federation will also direct its efforts in ensuring national security in the foreign policy sphere into resolving problems of international and economic cooperation, first and foremost from the viewpoint of strengthening its position in international financial and economic organizations.

Ensuring the Russian Federation's national security in the defense sphere is a most important area of state activity and an object of constant public attention. The main aim of the practical activity of the state and society in this sphere is to improve the military organization of the Russian Federation in order to ensure the potential for an appropriate response to the threats that could arise in the 21st century, in conjunction with rational levels of expenditure on national defense.

The nature of these threats requires the clarification of the tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, military formations, and organs, the optimization of their structure and composition, the expansion of their professional nucleus, and the improvement of the legal bases and planning mechanism for military organizational development and the formulation of up-to-date approaches to economic and financial support for it in the light of the need to form a collective security system within the CIS framework.

Russia does not seek to maintain parity in arms and armed forces with the leading states of the world, and is oriented toward the implementation of the principle of realistic deterrence, at the basis of which is the determination to make appropriate use of the available military might to avert aggression. In seeking to avert war and armed conflict, the Russian Federation gives preference to political, economic, and other non-military means. However, until the nonuse of force becomes the norm in international relations, the Russian Federation's national interests require the existence of a military might sufficient for its defense.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces are the basis of the state's military organization. They play the main role in safeguarding the Russian Federation's national security by means of force.

The most important task for the Russian Federation Armed Forces is to ensure nuclear deterrence in the interests of preventing both nuclear and conventional large-

scale or regional wars, and to implement alliance commitments.

In order to perform this task the Russian Federation must have nuclear forces with the potential to guarantee the infliction of the required damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states.

The protection of the state's national interests requires comprehensive counteraction of military threats on a regional and local scale. The Russian Federation Armed Forces in their peacetime combat composition should be capable of ensuring the reliable defense of the country against air and space attack and the performance of tasks to rebuff aggression in a local war, and of deploying a grouping of troops (forces) to perform tasks in a regional war. At the same time the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the Russian Federation's implementation of peacekeeping activity both in its own right and within international organizations.

The interests of ensuring Russia's national security and the evolution of the geopolitical situation in the world predetermine, in certain circumstances, the need for Russia's military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited troop contingents (military bases) there on a treaty basis and on the principles of partnership should demonstrate the Russian Federation's readiness to fulfill its alliance commitments, promote the formation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in the regions, and give the Russian Federation the potential to react to a crisis situation at the initial stages of its emergence.

A most important area in ensuring the Russian Federation's national security in the defense sphere is the clarification and optimization of the tasks of the system of ensuring national security. In performing tasks in preventing and countering internal threats to the Russian Federation's national security, priority belongs to the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, and the Russian Federation Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters, which must have the appropriate forces, resources, and organs capable of fulfilling specialized tasks.

The Russian Federation examines the possibility of using military force to safeguard its national security on the basis of the following principles: Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state; the utilization of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces must be effected in a decisive, consistent, and planned manner until conditions beneficial to the Russian Federation for the conclusions of peace are created; the utilization of military force must be effected on a legal basis and only when all non-military measures for resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective; the utilization of military force against civilians to achieve domestic political objectives is not permitted. At the same time, joint actions by individual formations of the Armed Forces and other troops, troop formations, and organs against illegal armed formations posing a threat to the national interests of the Russian Federation is permitted in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws; the participation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in wars and conflicts of different intensity and scale must be effected in

order to resolve priority military-political and military-strategic tasks meeting Russia's national interests and also its commitments as an ally.

In current conditions of universal computerization and the development of information technology the significance of safeguarding the Russian Federation's national security in the information sphere is growing sharply.

The most important tasks here are: the establishment of the requisite balance between the need for the free exchange of information and permissible restrictions on its dissemination; the improvement of the informational structure, the acceleration of the development of new information technologies and their widespread utilization, and the standardization of systems for the retrieval, collection, storage, processing, and analysis of information taking account of Russia's becoming part of the global information infrastructure; the formulation of an appropriate statutory legal base and the coordination—with the Federal Government communications and Information Agency Under the Russian Federation President playing the leading role—of the activity of federal organs of state power and other organs resolving information security tasks; the development of the Russian telecommunications and information systems industry and the priority dissemination of these systems on the domestic market in comparison with foreign counterparts; the protection of state information assets [resurs], primarily in federal organs of state power and at defense complex enterprises;

The Russian Federation intends to resolutely and firmly strengthen its national security on the basis of both historical experience and the positive experience of the country's democratic development. The legal democratic institutions that have been created, the structure of Russian Federation organs of state power that has become established, and the extensive participation of political parties and public associations in formulating the strategy for safeguarding national security make it possible to safeguard the Russian Federation's national security and progressive development in the 21st century.

As Russia continues to develop and a new system of international relations based on equal partnership is formed and strengthens, individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint will be augmented, clarified, and concretized in the Russian Federation president's annual messages to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I finally thank my friend from Delaware for the civility with which this debate is taking place. If David Broder is watching, I am sure he is relieved—he wrote this morning that there are things more important than renaming airports—that this debate has commenced. And let it continue in this mode and we will see how it comes out.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. While the Senator from New York is in the Chamber—and I have said this privately but also sometimes it is worth saying in public—there quite literally is no one for whom I have greater respect than the Senator from New York. I think he is the single

most erudite, single brightest and the single most informed person serving in the Senate. I must tell you only he has made me wonder even for a moment, after 5 months of debating this with myself, whether the resolution I have reached with expansion is correct. Only he has given me a twinge in his opposition. I mean that sincerely. He was kind enough, after meeting with some of our colleagues, to call me at my home a couple weeks ago and to sort of forewarn me—that was not the purpose of the call—but forewarn me that he may be settling on the position he has, and I made my plea over the phone with him. I kept him on the phone for about 15 minutes making my arguments why I thought we should expand. And I got off the phone, and I turned to my son, who knows of my admiration for the Senator, and I said, I have been around this place a long, long time. Here I am on the phone trying to—and I say this very respectfully—educate the most informed man I know about a position that I thought he was wrong on. I was certain of my assertions on the phone. And I hung up and I thought for a brief moment, if he thinks that way, I must be wrong. But I quickly overcame that, and I would just suggest that it is one of the rare occasions I have disagreed with the Senator. So it is not hard to be civil when you admire someone as much as I do the Senator. I promise I will not resort again to such personal references, but I mean it sincerely when I say to my friend that I listen to everything he has to say. I disagree with him on this.

I would make one comment—I know he has to leave the floor—and then I will yield the floor to my friend from Rhode Island, because I have had plenty of occasion to speak already today.

With regard to the document my friend references, it does reference expansion of NATO. But I would respectfully suggest that, like many times in human endeavors, the same conclusion would have been reached had expansion not been contemplated. I assert that the demise of the Soviet—I doubt whether my friend would disagree with me—the demise of not only the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army but the Russian military had nothing to do with the expansion of NATO.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. No.

Mr. BIDEN. And I would further argue, although I have not read the document, that if the document is complete, which it is asserted to be and I believe it to be, that the strategic judgment made to rely upon nuclear weapons was arrived at in the same way that NATO arrived at a similar judgment 30 years earlier when we concluded that we were not prepared or able to keep 40 or 50 or 60 divisions in Europe to meet a conventional attack by our Warsaw Pact enemies.

That is a long way of saying that, were we to announce that we were ceasing and desisting from an effort to expand NATO at this moment and went on record, the strategic planners in

Moscow, in my view, would be compelled to reach the conclusion that they reached in the document that was posited on the Senate floor for the RECORD today.

I do not in any way underestimate the impact of damaged psyches on national policy. I do not in any way, in any sense, underestimate that feelings of isolation on the part of the Russian military, the Russians, might produce an extension of a position that otherwise would have been reached anyway. But I would conclude by saying I do not believe that the strategic document that the Senator spoke to today is as a consequence—notwithstanding that it mentions the expansion of NATO—of the talk of expanding with the inclusion of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland into NATO.

But my friend from Rhode Island has another urgent meeting he wishes to attend. I am happy to yield the floor.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I, too, yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAIRCLOTH). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the treaty be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The treaty will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, two-thirds of the Senators—

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The text of the Resolution of Ratification is printed in the March 6, 1998 edition of the RECORD.)

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—H.R. 2646

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, these are requests I am making on behalf of the leadership. I can only assume they have been agreed to by the minority.

Mr. President, as in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent that the cloture votes with respect to the education A+ bill occur beginning at 5:45 p.m. on Thursday, March 19.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I want to remind all my colleagues that, under rule XXII, all first-degree amendments must be filed at the desk by 1 p.m. tomorrow and second-degree amendments must be filed by 4:45 tomorrow in order to qualify under the "timely filed" requirement postcloture.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from the great State of Maryland.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I wish to speak on NATO enlargement and wish to consume such time as necessary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, this is a truly historic occasion. Today the Senate begins debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement. By ratifying this treaty, we are building an undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe for the new millennium. I stand here to support NATO enlargement because it will make Europe more stable and America more secure. It means that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will share the burden of European security.

It also means that future generations of Americans might not have to fight nor die for Europe. America has fought and won three wars in Europe: World War I, when an assassination in Yugoslavia led to years of bloodshed; World War II, the bloodiest war in history when thousands of Americans left factories and farms to fight on the battlefields of Europe; and we won the cold war, when Soviet expansionism forced us to prepare to defend Western Europe when the captive nations of Eastern Europe were forced behind the Iron Curtain.

If NATO does not enlarge, the Iron Curtain will remain permanent and the unnatural division of Europe will live on longer than the Soviet empire did. As a Polish American, I and members of my family have been waiting years for this debate to occur. I know that the Polish people did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the Baltic States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world.

My great grandmother had three pictures on her mantlepiece: One of Pope Pius XII, because we were Catholic and are Catholic, and that was her Pope; my uncle Joe, who was on the Baltimore City Police Department, and we were so proud of what he had achieved; and the other picture, of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of what he had done for working people.

But after Yalta and Potsdam, my great grandmother turned the Roosevelt picture face down on her mantle and she let it stay there until the day she died because of what happened at Yalta and Potsdam. That is why many of us cannot forget the history of that region, the placing of a nation and the

other nations, the captive nations, involuntarily under the servitude and boot heel of then the evil empire.

But my support for NATO enlargement is not based on nostalgia, nor is it based on the past; it is based on the future, and it is support as an American. I support NATO enlargement because I believe that it will make America and Europe more stable and more secure. NATO enlargement means a future in which the newly free and democratic countries will take their rightful places as members of Europe. NATO played an important role in securing this freedom. It has been the most successful defense alliance in world history. It is an alliance that helped us win the cold war. It deterred war between the superpowers, and it has helped prevent confrontation between member states.

But if NATO is to survive, it must adapt to meet the needs of the post-cold-war world or it will become irrelevant.

NATO has evolved since it was created in 1949. We have enlarged NATO on three different occasions, and each new member strengthened NATO and increased security in Europe.

Today, we are facing very different threats to security and stability in Europe. We have civil wars, as in Bosnia; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and regional tensions, as in Kosovo; we have international crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the very real threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must meet the needs of these new threats, and I believe it will do so by changing and expanding. Europe's new democracies will help us meet these challenges.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to help us address these new threats. How many times have we in the Senate discussed burdensharing in Europe? How often have we complained that European countries were not willing to pay their fair share for the European defense?

Now we have countries that are asking to share the burden. They are asking to pledge their troops and equipment for the common defense. They are asking to share the burden of peacekeeping. In fact, they are doing it right now in Bosnia, where there are thousands of troops from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Mr. President, Hungary is a base camp for our troops which enables them to be in Bosnia. These new nations have even committed to joining us in Iraq to help us deal with ending Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program, which is more than some of our allies.

These countries are not asking for a handout; they are asking for a handshake, a handshake to welcome them into NATO. They are not asking for our protection; they are asking to be full partners in the new Europe and in the new world order. By transforming these countries into free-market democracies, they have earned this right. These new democracies will contribute